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With the renewed focus on Unconventional Warfare as a means of achieving U.S. 
Foreign and National Security Policy goals, the U.S. Army Special Operations Command 
Civil Affairs force must assess its capability to conduct Civil Affairs operations in 
support of an Unconventional Warfare campaign. This thesis examines Civil Affairs’ 
current role and surveys past conflicts to explore Civil Affairs’ potential role in all phases 
of Unconventional Warfare. It assumes that political and logistical networks are the keys 
to building and sustaining a revolutionary movement. This thesis answers the following 
questions: How can Civil Affairs forces in place now and deployed for an operation 
identify, develop and motivate revolutionary networks that can be activated to sustain a 
revolution and fulfill U.S. policy needs within a foreign nation?  How can Civil Affairs 
doctrine be revised to better support these tasks?  
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I. INTRODUCTION  
The relief movement is a tool for the realization of the united front. It can 
directly unite all classes and parties to oppose militarist and imperialist 
oppression and indirectly arouse the great masses to participate in and 
sympathize with the revolutionary movement. Party headquarters at all 
levels should pay great attention to relief work and earnestly carry out the 
following tasks:…1 
—Soviet Document “Resolutions on the Relief Movement” 
seized by the Peking National Police at the Soviet Military 
Attaché Office on April 6, 1925 
 
The Iranian regime is holding on to power through coercion and repression, 
effectively maintaining internal power and projecting international influence that may 
threaten U.S. security interests in grave ways. As this drama plays out, the United States 
has a limited array of strategic options available to deal with such hostility. The president 
could decide that it is in the interest of the U.S. to influence regime change there in 
support of U.S. national security objectives. In recognition of the power of influence 
operations on a resistance movement, U.S. Civil Affairs forces, the “masters of the civil 
domain,” could be called on to conduct civil activities that weaken the regime and 
strengthen the opposition. Such an operation would require organizers with tact, 
resourcefulness, maturity and discretion in full measure.  
After eleven years of openly supporting combat and counterinsurgency 
operations, the 95th Civil Affairs Brigade finds itself in the same boat as the rest of U.S. 
Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) clambering to retrain itself to support an 
Unconventional Warfare (UW) campaign. A cursory exploration of how civic action fits 
into UW reveals that Civil Affairs has a significant role to play in post-conflict 
reconstruction and in the legitimization of the government that emerges from a resistance  
 
 
                                                 
1 C. Martin Wilbur and Julie Lien-ying How, Missionaries of Revolution; Soviet Advisors and 
Nationalist China, 1920–1927 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989). 
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and the UW campaign that supports it. This thesis will show that Civil Affairs has a 
significant role to play in every phase of any campaign to coerce, disrupt or overthrow an 
undesirable regime.   
The 95th Civil Affairs Brigade is the USASOC unit that specializes in conducting 
Civil Affairs activities. With the renewed focus on Unconventional Warfare, the 
USASOC Civil Affairs force must assess its capability to conduct Civil Affairs 
operations in support of an Unconventional Warfare campaign. This thesis will examine 
Civil Affairs’ current and potential role in all phases of UW. It will focus especially on 
methods to identify, assess, develop and motivate current and potential military and 
civilian leaders for key roles at all levels of a potential revolutionary organization. 
Political and logistical networks are keys to building and sustaining a 
revolutionary movement. A survey conducted in the course of this research shows that 70 
percent of Civil Affairs soldiers in USASOC are confident that they are prepared to 
“assess and recruit civil leaders and facilitators to build and activate resistance networks 
in preparation for a UW campaign.” When asked what aspects of civic action were 
important to the success of that campaign, however, those same respondents disagreed 
greatly. According to the survey results, CA soldiers believe that Mass Mobilization 
(MM) and Populace and Resource Control (PRC) are relatively unimportant compared to 
Key Leader Engagement, Access and Placement, and Civil Reconnaissance in a UW 
context (just 13.1% listed MM and PRC as one of the top three).2  Based on the cases 
described in this thesis, Mass Mobilization is one of the key components to coercion, 
disruption and overthrow of an entrenched regime, and PRC is a key component of 
mobilizing the populace. One respondent, showing some inherent knowledge of what this 
thesis will highlight, commented “PRC can be reversed to take legitimacy away from the 
current government, pull necessary resources from the public to support the resistance 
movement and meet needs of the populace through the Shadow Government or social 
movement leaders.” We agree, and consequently believe that Civil Affairs forces 
                                                 
2 The coauthors distributed a survey to 164 USASOC personnel, in person and via e-mail. One 
hundred twenty-nine soldiers completed the survey. Of those, 104 identified their Military Occupational 
Specialty. The results are cross-tabulated with Military Occupational Specialty in the Appendix.   
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deployed now should be trained and prepared to identify, develop and motivate 
revolutionary networks that can be activated to sustain a revolution and fulfill U.S. policy 
needs in a foreign country.   
The North Vietnamese demonstrated how important these networks are when they 
planted and grew them in Laos and South Vietnam in the mid-20th century.   Building on 
Mao Tse-Tung’s most basic ideas for recruiting and cadre-building, North Vietnamese 
communists capitalized on underground networks in their struggles against the Laotian 
and South Vietnamese governments. With political officers as the coequals of operational 
commanders, the communist Vietnamese were able to coopt and construct networks of 
influence that furthered their concept that “politics is war without bloodshed while war is 
politics with bloodshed.”3 With these networks, the communists built not only military 
capability but also civilian support for their efforts.   
Below is a graphic depiction of how the weight of effort in each of three lines of 
effort (LOE) in a UW campaign might look. The LOEs are Guerrilla Warfare, Mass 
Mobilization and Shadow Government. This is the ideal, based upon the amount of effort 
UW practitioners assigned to that LOE might be expected to exert during each phase of a 
UW campaign.4  It cannot be overstated that the greater the preparation in Phase 0 and 
Phase I for each LOE, the easier it will be to employ sponsored individuals, units and 
organizations in Phases II-VII. This recognizes that it is easier to establish contact with 
approachable political and social movement leaders before violence increases to a scale 
where the people are preoccupied with survival and physical struggle. 
                                                 
3 Mao Tse-Tung, “On Protracted War” (May 1938), Selected Works, Vol. II, 152–53  accessed on 
October 22nd, 2012 at http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/works/red-book/ch05.htm.  
4 The U.S. Army’s seven phases of Unconventional Warfare are: I. Preparation, II. Initial Contact, III. 
Infiltration, IV. Organization, V. Buildup, VI. Employment and VII. Transition.  
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Figure 1.  Guerrilla Warfare, Mass Mobilization and Shadow Government Lines of 
Operation. Blue, Red and Black shapes indicate the level of civic action 
effort expected during each phase in support of each LOO. 
As a UW campaign progresses, the weight of emphasis on any single line of 
operation will change, but each will gradually trend upward until Phase VII Transition, 
when only the development and employment of the Shadow Government will continue to 
increase. Whether working to identify the right leader to spearhead a revolution in 
America’s interest or reinforcing an already-powerful leader in a revolution of his design, 
the work of picking the right way to help the right person should be done well before any 
pilot team is inserted. Any operations that are planned and conducted up to and through 
Phase VI must be done with great consideration for how they will affect the long-term 
sustainability of the new government post-transition.   
A. CONCEPTS 
Hypothesis: Employing Civil Affairs forces to support the three lines of effort in 
an Unconventional Warfare campaign will increase the likelihood of success. 
Our hypothesis is derived from three trends identified in studying various 
insurgencies and how they came to exist, sustain themselves and expand their power. The 
first is that access to materiel and resources, and the ability to distribute them 
clandestinely in a way that supports resistance networks’ influence operations, increases 
the expected success of an Unconventional Warfare campaign. Second, a network of 
strong, individual local resistance leaders with established support and political networks 
increase the likelihood that a UW campaign will succeed. Third, coordination between 
these elements of logistical support and political leadership as well as with the Guerrilla 
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Warfare element is necessary to strengthening the resistance, and in turn the UW 
campaign. Our contention is that current Civil Affairs doctrine and recent operational 
experience do not enable the Civil Affairs contingent in a UW Task Force to effectively 
leverage what is needed to support of an insurgency.   
In recent cases, such as Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Philippines, Civil Affairs forces 
have traditionally been assigned five doctrinal core tasks: Civil Information Management 
(CIM), Populace and Resource Control (PRC), Support to Civil Administration (SCA), 
Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (FHA), and Nation Assistance (NA). These are 
important for the role that CA plays in most traditional combat situations, but insufficient 
to identify, develop, and motivate the right people for the job of revolution within an 
Unconventional Warfare campaign. Of the five doctrinal tasks, Civil Affairs forces can 
most effectively apply elements of CIM, PRC, and FHA in support of the guerrilla, 
underground and auxiliary in UW. The planning and execution of these tasks in recent 
Counter-Insurgency (COIN) operations has generally been from the top down, relying on 
existing or U.S.-built Host Nation government administration and logistics networks to 
push aid and materiel to target populations. In UW, those networks will not be available 
to friendly forces and will likely be openly hostile and antagonistic toward insurgent civic 
action. Consequently, UW planners and implementers must be able to work within and 
outside of these five tasks to maximize political and civic action efforts and achieve 
desired effects. They must also be flexible and creative in finding access into vulnerable 
target populations and in identifying and developing the logistics necessary to link them 
up with assistance. The legal authorities involved will be in some cases restrictive and in 
others liberating. In all cases, it is important that UW planners and implementers 
understand and work within them to achieve desired effects. This includes coordinating 
activities with stakeholders in other government agencies to ensure synergy and limit turf 
conflicts. They must also understand how to work with these organizations to capitalize 
on overlapping authorities and implement effective support mechanisms to bolster 
revolutionary organizations. 
U.S. UW doctrine places the burden of responsibility on tactical CA teams to 
provide tactical CA support, to include “assessment, planning and coordination with the 
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civil component and International Government Organizations (IGO), Non-Government 
Organizations (NGO) and Indigenous Populations and Institutions (IPI) in areas where 
[friendly] military forces are present” (FM 3–05.130, para 7–7). This permissive 
environment is not likely to exist in a grassroots UW environment and ignores the 
necessity that UW must be conducted with tact and discretion, from Phase 0 through 
Phase VII. U.S. national authority officials and UW planners and implementers must 
consider all possibilities for conducting a UW campaign. Questions of access, authorities, 
regional influence, personal and strategic security, and many others will determine how 
and when a UW campaign might succeed. Building capable and willing civil and political 
cadres is necessary, but may be physically impossible within a countries geographic 
border. In restrictive environments, CA forces may have to accomplish their mission 
through International Government Organizations (IGO), Indigenous Populations and 
Institutions (IPI), Non-Government Organizations (NGO), dissident organizations or with 
governments in exile located outside the country. In North Korea or Iran, for instance, 
where the United States has troops openly serving on the borders, it may be easier to gain 
contacts, strengthen local leaders, and develop logistical programs from outside the 
country than it is to hide an American in Pyongyang or Tehran. Finally, the focus of 
current Civil Affairs doctrine is on the technical application of the five core tasks and 
omits the primacy of a nuanced and trust-based strategic plan to identify, develop and 
motivate the people who can best do that from within the target environment. It also fails 
to address the organizational and functional implementation or emphasize diverse 
solutions to complex problems.   
Historically, as we will illustrate, the use of civic action strengthened UW and 
resistance campaigns. The networks of interagency, international, regional and local 
contacts that CA soldiers build in the course of combat and Civil Military Support 
Element (CMSE) missions enable CA to connect individuals and organizations with 
money and resources. The active duty component of the Civil Affairs branch has ties to 
academic, political and other professionals who can provide both hands-on and remote 
expertise to teams in the field and their surrogate partners. The Civil Information 
Management (CIM) component has the potential to bridge the information gap between 
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U.S. military, the U.S. government, the IGO/NGO communities and the revolutionary on 
the ground, thereby connecting him with the right resource at the right place to help him 
in his quest to mobilize the people.   In contrast, but just as importantly, CIM can provide 
the necessary information to also deny those same resources and people to the state. 
Given that any UW campaign will have three common lines of operation; Guerrilla 
Warfare, Mass Mobilization and Shadow Government, Civil Affairs can support all lines 
of operation in a UW campaign. Of course, CA may not be the supporting element, but 
the element leading a particular effort. 
B. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis examines some common trends across a series of case studies and 
proposes a way to take advantage of the access that Civil Affairs forces have to relevant 
populations in order to establish and maintain relevant networks. These logistical and 
political networks, especially when established in advance of a UW campaign and 
coordinated by Civil Affairs operators during the course of the campaign, will have the 
overall effect of increasing the success of that campaign. In researching this topic we dug 
into a number of cases of insurgency engaged in over the past century. The case studies 
we include are of the Philippines post-World War II, Laos in the 1960s, Muqtada al-
Sadr’s Mahdi Army in Iraq 2003–2007, and the Taliban from 2001–the present. In 
examining these, we pay particular attention to how logistical and political networks were 
formed or leveraged. In addition to the case studies, we present evidence drawn from 
current U.S. Special Operations soldiers. Through a survey of UW planners, commanders 
and trainees, as well as first-hand observation of UW training events, we assess the 
current state of understanding of civic action as a tool for network development and 
mobilization as well as the willingness to engage in civic action.   Our historical review 
via the case studies isolates critical Civil Affairs techniques for UW, while our survey 
and interviews point to gaps and lead to recommendations for where and how to 
implement UW-oriented CA techniques in training and operations. This thesis will not 
recommend a plan for the Guerrilla Warfare line of operation, but will make 
recommendations for how Civic Action and Civil Network Development can support that 
LOE, especially through Mass Mobilization and Shadow Government development. 
 8
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II. ED LANSDALE; CIVIC ACTION IN SUPPORT OF FOREIGN 
INTERNAL DEFENSE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
LTC Edward Geary Lansdale undertook an ingenious plan to replace a corrupt, 
incompetent government with a trustworthy, proactive, and pro-American administration 
in the Philippines in the early 1950s. His aim was to install a government that was willing 
to fight an insurgency. In order to do so he had to remove the existing government. He 
and his team employed numerous unorthodox, Unconventional Warfare techniques that 
resulted in the rescue of a state on the verge of failure. He helped bring into power a man 
who could fight the Communist rebellion and who would not participate in the crony 
capitalism that had been the status quo. This chapter will explore how Lansdale and a 
handful of helpers took a bare-bones approach to waging a contest for popular support 
that relied on their own inventiveness, the creativity of their advisees, and the power of 
well-placed dollars to prop up a struggling administration in order to narrowly avoid the 
loss of an American ally to the influence of communism.   
While in practice most of Lansdale’s reforms amounted to Counter-Insurgency 
rather than Unconventional Warfare, his is a shining example of how individual and 
network mobilization, coordinated by an external source with access to funding, materiel, 
and technology, can enhance the overall effectiveness of an operation, whether the goal is 
countering or supporting insurgency. Key to accomplishing this was divining who among 
the Philippine government could be trusted to adopt and enforce a sense of resolve about 
defeating the communists, and who would be willing to make the necessary changes that 
would enable the corrupt government to reform and win popular support. Lansdale and 
his team developed networks that provided not only tactical intelligence, but support 
mechanisms for the counterinsurgency effort from the ground level up. Lansdale’s efforts 
to influence trustworthy and capable Filipino leaders and to help them get to the top of 




own. He replaced a band of complacent, corrupt bureaucrats with organized, efficient 
teams of aggressive, dependable warriors in the military and effective leaders in the 
government. 
B. THE HUKS 
“If I worked in those sugar fields I’d probably be a Huk myself.” 
—General Douglas MacArthur5 
 
Communist and socialist ideologies spread widely throughout the Philippines 
during the 1930s. Many of these left-leaning farmers temporarily put aside those 
ideologies when the Japanese invaded their homeland, and instead helped build an 
effective and deadly armed resistance. The Hukbong Bayan Laban sa Hapon, or People’s 
Anti-Japanese Army, was formed in Luzon during World War II to wage Guerrilla 
Warfare. The Huks, as they were known, fought fiercely and admirably. They also took 
advantage of the chaos of World War II to seize most of the wealth and land in central 
Luzon.6 They established a Shadow Government anchored in the local Barrio United 
Defense Corps (BUDC), which was capable of exercising civil administration 
responsibilities by collecting taxes and establishing and enforcing their own laws while 
building the intelligence and logistical backbone for their army.   
When the American Army returned in 1944, General MacArthur acknowledged 
their “socialistic”7 tendencies, rationalizing and minimizing them as a product of the 
corrupt and unrepresentative economic and political conditions under which the people 
lived. Ed Lansdale’s reports from the same period were less forgiving, describing the 
Huks as having an iron grip on five provinces and working toward a tipping point where  
 
 
                                                 
5 William Manchester,  American Ceaser: Douglas MacArthur, 1890–1964  (Boston, Little, Brown 
and Company, 1978). 420. As quoted in Cecil B. Currey. Edward Lansdale: Unquiet American 
(Washington, DC: Brassey’s, 1998), 38.   
6 Cecil B. Currey,  Edward Lansdale: Unquiet American (Washington, DC: Brassey’s, 1998), 37. 
7 William Manchester, American Ceaser: As quoted in Cecil B. Currey, Unquiet American, 38.   
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they would start their revolution. When the war was over, the Huks refused to give up 
their 500,000 American and Japanese weapons to what they believed was a corrupt and 
oligarchic government.8   
Huk leader Luis Taruc won a seat in the 1946 congressional elections, but was 
excluded from participation. This further separated the Huks and their sympathizers from 
the government in Manila. Upon his own election in 1946, President Roxas announced 
that his policy toward the Huks would be one of an “iron fist.”  This heavy-handed tactic 
applied brute military and police force against the Huks wherever they were found, often 
inflicting heavy civilian casualties along the way. The Huks withdrew into the jungle and 
initiated a rebellion that would occupy the Philippine government and military until 1954. 
Largely because of low morale among government troops and heavy-handed retaliation 
policies that turned the population toward them, the Huks nearly overcame their obstacles 
in early 1950 and seemed on the verge of achieving their revolutionary goals. Their 
troops fought their way to the outskirts of Manila, where they met their match in the 
newly revived Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) under Defense Minister Ramon 
Magsaysay. 
C. BUILDING A GOVERNMENT WITHIN A GOVERNMENT 
Magsaysay learned from childhood that honesty and integrity were important and 
at times expensive. His father lost his teaching job when he refused to pass the school 
superintendent’s failing son in his class.9  The family had to move to another village and 
reestablish themselves, but his father visibly stuck to his principles, making an indelible 
mark on Ramon.   
By the time WWII came to the Philippine Islands, Magsaysay had worked his 
way up from bus mechanic to manager of the Try Transportation Bus Company in 
Manila. He again worked his way up as a member of the Filipino guerrilla forces fighting 
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the Japanese, ascending from captain to commander of the Zambales Military District, in 
charge of ten thousand U.S. Armed Forces—Far East (USAFFE) fighters. MacArthur 
recognized his “honesty, integrity, and ability” with a promotion to Military Governor of 
Zambales in 1945.10  President Roxas and 11,000 of Magsaysay’s men urged him to run 
for office, and Magsaysay won a seat in the House of Representatives in the 1946 
election. He was then appointed to the House Committee on National Defense, became 
the committee chairman, and was directly responsible for reorganizing the security and 
armed forces to better combat the Huk danger. This included transferring control of the 
Police Constabulary from the interior ministry to the defense ministry and organizing the 
AFP into battalion combat teams (BCT).11  He held the Constabulary indefinitely in key 
positions to defend villages so that the BCTs could move into the environs of 
“Huklandia” and take the fight to the rebels.   
During his tenure as chairman, Magsaysay traveled to the United States, where, 
with the overt help of the National Security Council, President Truman, and the covert 
assistance of Ed Lansdale and the CIA’s Office of Policy Coordination (OPC), he 
procured $10 million for AFP salaries and money-for-information campaigns. It was in 
Washington where he met Ed Lansdale for the first time, building a personal and 
professional relationship that would inevitably affect the future of the Philippines. This 
meeting would pay the aforementioned financial dividends in the near future and more 
extensive dividends in the medium and long term, but for the moment Magsaysay would 
return to Manila to accept appointment as the Secretary of National Defense. The Joint 
U.S. Military Advisory Group chief and many within his own administration urged 
President Quirino to appoint Magsaysay to this position. Magsaysay agreed to accept, but 
stipulated that he be given free rein to quell the Huk rebellion. Concurrently, he was 
approached by a group of senior military officers to join a coup and overthrow the 
president. His response was to request that the officers involved give him ninety days in 
office to exercise free rein before staging the coup, stating, “If I haven’t done anything by 
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then, go ahead.”12  His reputation was strong enough to delay the disgruntled AFP 
leaders in taking action. His counterinsurgency techniques were effective enough to 
prevent it from ever happening.   
Magsaysay had developed a reputation as a soldier’s soldier early on and 
maintained it throughout his tenure as Secretary of National Defense. Ed Lansdale’s 
outwardly naive but always thoughtful delight in war13 plus his well-advertised affinity 
for the Filipino people14 were force multipliers in his dealings with them. That Lansdale 
and Magsaysay had a great personal and professional relationship is beyond question, but 
the task of reinforcing Magsaysay as “The Guy” in the eyes of the Filipinos was not 
simply a matter of giving him money and weapons hoping that he would do the right 
thing. Lansdale and JUSMAG devoted their energies to mentoring and reinforcing 
Magsaysay at every turn. Charles Bohannan, Lansdale’s deputy, is frank about what it 
took: 
How did they operate? By working, in one way or another all the time; by 
spending virtually (and this is literally true) a minimum of 20 hours a day 
with Filipinos . . . by poking their noses into everything....By never 
leaving the key man alone except when he went to bed with his wife, until 
he was thoroughly indoctrinated.15  
Lansdale worked for the Office of Policy Coordination, a CIA-linked but 
independent organization designed to carry “out a covert foreign policy in support of 
overt aims,”16 and under cover of the JUSMAG and 13th Air Force.17 Under these 
covers, he developed Magsaysay and like-minded military and political leaders into a 
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potent network within the bureaucratic and unwieldy larger Philippine Government and 
military. They were thus able to capitalize on the existing networks which they developed 
through persistent engagement with key members of the Philippine government to bring 
civic, military, and political action to bear at key times in the struggle against the Huks, 
in contrast to the establishment governors, mayors and commanders operating under the 
Iron Fist doctrine. As we will see below, coordinating these individuals and networks to 
gain strategic effects from tactical successes was simple, but by no means easy. 
Lansdale carefully helped craft Magsaysay into a candidate who could fulfill his 
mission to “protect American interests in the Philippines and to consolidate a power base 
for Ramon Magsaysay.”18 Magsaysay was at times reluctant and lacked confidence in his 
ability to be president. Lansdale was an angel on his shoulder at all times; counseling him 
that the country needed him, that he was the only man honorable and committed enough 
to fight the insurgency, and that his deep love of the Philippine people made him the only 
choice for the job.19  In the course of developing Magsaysay, Lansdale also helped spot 
and recruit trustworthy subordinate leaders like Manuel Manahan. Manahan administered 
the Presidential Complaints and Action Commission (PCAC), resolving some 
27,000 grievances against various levels of government and bolstering Magsaysay’s 
image as a man of the people along the way.20 This selection, and others like it, ensured 
that Magsaysay’s commitment to fight the insurgency and build trust in the government 
was echoed far and wide across the country.   
Throughout his campaign to assist Magsaysay to win the Presidency, Lansdale 
gathered existing networks under his umbrella of influence and put them to work. 
Through his Civil Affairs Office (CAO), he had positive stories about Magsaysay placed 
in American-controlled Filipino newspapers. These stories eventually filtered out to the 
rest of the media as local journalists joined the chorus praising Magsaysay and 
admonishing President Quirino. He introduced Magsaysay to influential Americans and 
international civic organizations like the Lions Club, going so far as to write speeches for 
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him for these occasions.21 In Manila, Lansdale befriended and recruited numerous civic 
organizations to help organize and motivate voters, to include Catholic Action, the 
Jaycees, the Rotary Club, the Lions Club, the League of Women Voters, and the 
Committee for Good Government.22  Gabriel Kaplan, an OPC-provided assistant, helped 
Lansdale to do this, urging Filipinos to unite local chapters of their civic organizations 
and demand free and honest elections. Kaplan himself brought together many of these 
organizations under the name NAMFREL; the National Movement for Free Elections. 
With NAMFREL as a strong voice for electoral legitimacy and veterans groups enlisted 
to assist with electoral monitoring, Lansdale was able to use the election to bring trust to 
the government and discredit to the Huk leaders. With “free and fair” elections in place, it 
was exponentially more difficult for the Huks to win influence via violence and armed 
rebellion.23  In an amazing demonstration of Lansdale’s ingenuity and political savvy, he 
was even able to convince three rising political candidates within Magsaysay’s own 
Nacionalista party to give up their presidential aspirations and assist in Magsaysay’s 
campaign.24 Interpersonal skills and advertising acumen were important attributes for 
men like Lansdale and Kaplan as they undertook such a grand scheme. Without these and 
other character traits, the effort to make Magsaysay president might never have 
succeeded. 
Charles Bohannon describes some of the attributes that enabled the Americans to 
succeed, to include experience working and fighting with Filipinos, “top-level U.S. 
backing stateside and tolerance or cooperation from local U.S. authorities.” Lansdale and 
his team earned and enjoyed full cooperation from Magsaysay, and respect turned into 
fear from President Quirino.25 Meanwhile, the effective marriage between U.S. and 
Filipino military and government officers made it possible to link civic action, deception 
operations, psychological warfare, and direct military action together to defeat the Huks 
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in four years. Lansdale had to work within Magsaysay’s and the Filipinos’ goals and 
adopt the narratives that motivated them to succeed. These narratives supported and were 
supported by efforts that advanced Magsaysay politically, made the AFP a viable force to 
fight the Huks, united organizations into coalitions that bolstered his standing among the 
population, and ultimately helped Lansdale succeed.   
D. GENERATING RESOURCES AND COOPTING NETWORKS 
“Whatever it was that hurt me most as a guerrilla…we are going to do 
now to the Huk.”26 
—Ramon Magsaysay 
The Economic Development Corporation (EDCOR) was one critical component 
of an effective civic action campaign with psychological effects that reverberated beyond 
its direct economic effects. Here is the EDCOR methodology: a Huk troop surrenders, he 
promises that he will reform, he is re-educated and possibly made to fight against the 
Huks, and he is then rewarded with a plot of land and the means to turn it into a viable 
farm. As an example of wisely employing resource control methods, he is contractually 
obligated to supply food and services to the community as repayment for the land. 
Meanwhile retired AFP officers lived among the EDCOR recipients as a means of 
ensuring that the EDCOR reserves would not become Huk regrouping camps.   
This program is a prime example of how civic action programs served as a force-
multiplier. Estimates of the numbers of Huks who surrendered are generally between 
1,000 and 1,500, but the Philippine government estimated that it would have taken about 
30,000 troops to achieve the same effect in combat action.27 EDCOR denied the Huks 
fighters and provided some 5,000 families with a living. More importantly, word about 
the EDCOR villages spread quickly, and demonstrated to the average Filipino that 
Magsaysay was serious about supporting the population by improving the plight of the 
average farmer. This and the fact that Lansdale had Magsaysay’s men steal the Huk 
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slogan of “Land for the Landless” for EDCOR purposes28 and tied it to their own 
strategic objectives provided a serious blow to Huk recruiting. 
Lansdale and Magsaysay used the Civil Affairs Office to facilitate the spread of 
civic action as an operational tool throughout the AFP. The CAO flooded the airwaves 
and the public consciousness with anti-Huk propaganda through student organizations, 
newspapers, leaflets, and public radio. The CAO directly employed journalists and radio 
announcers, feeding them advantageous information. It also instilled a sense of 
community participation by organizing and facilitating over 6,000 public meetings29 and 
co-opting existing religious, social, and communications networks in order to spread 
themes and messages. Through the CAO, Lansdale orchestrated an education campaign 
that introduced students from elementary school through university to ideas that bolstered 
both Magsaysay and the counterinsurgency campaign. Those behind the education 
campaign sponsored anticommunist forums and patriotic essay contests.30  These 
activities had a decidedly Filipino face and tone, which helped satisfy those who felt 
separated and underserved by their government and helped reverse the pull of those who 
felt drawn toward the Huks. All of these things supported tactical operations in the field. 
They were coordinated with combat operations to capitalize on AFP successes and kick 
the Huks when they were down and most desperate. Such civic action carved deeper into 
the Filipino psyche the impression that the Huk were no alternative to the caring and 
legitimate government.   
E. CONCLUSION: PROMOTING CHANGE TO FIGHT INSURGENCY 
What does any of this have to do with Civil Affairs’ Role in UW?  Magsaysay 
and his American sponsors had the luxury and benefit of a marginally organized and 
experienced AFP, a functioning government, and an enemy that was dispersed and 
geographically isolated. When supporting a friendly insurgency, UW practitioners will 
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invariably have to work in conditions far less hospitable than this. Nevertheless, the 
contours of the situation Lansdale and Magsaysay had to contend with were not unlike 
those found in many UW situations. Lansdale backed Magsaysay’s successful campaign 
for the presidency, disrupting imminent election fraud and the previously-discussed 
insurgency to help him become a viable and electable candidate. Lansdale was able to do 
so with tact and optimism, so much so that in 1954 Magsaysay asked Lansdale to return 
to the Philippines to help him implement more reforms.31   
In addition to the civic actions techniques that can be gleaned from this case, there 
are some specific concepts that are of particular importance to those interested in the 
coercion, disruption or overthrow of a government. First, developing cooperative leaders 
and organizations from among those who already exist is preferable to manufacturing 
them out of whole cloth. Second, a unified coalition of existing organizations that works 
toward the common goal of regime change is a powerful force worth capitalizing on for 
its strengths in diversity, wide spread appeal, and access to resources; by definition such a 
coalition nullifies the weaknesses that surface otherwise in loose, uncoordinated 
networks. Third, taking advantage of internal resources and supplementing them with 
necessary external support is preferable to a synthetic, manufactured version of resistance 
wherein the sponsor provides all of the resources and operational strength. Finally, tying 
civic action directly to military operations and carefully coordinating them to mutually 
support one another multiplies the positive effects that can be expected from either.   
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III. EDGAR BUELL, CIVIC ACTION IN SUPPORT OF 
GUERRILLA WARFARE 
Many people think it impossible for guerrillas to exist for long in the 
enemy’s rear. Such a belief reveals lack of comprehension of the 
relationship that should exist between the people and the troops. The 
former may be likened to water and the latter to the fish who inhabit it. 
How may it be said that these two cannot exist together?32 
—Mao Tse-Tung 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In the early 1950s, Viet Minh forces led by former history teacher Vo Nguyen 
Giap increased the tempo of the First Indo-China War and defeated the French at Dien 
Bien Phu, ultimately winning a victory for the revolutionary forces of Vietnam. Giap 
built up a substantial force of Viet Minh combat troops and logistical support units from 
among Vietnamese nationals. Inspired by Mao Tse-tung’s revolutionary concepts, part of 
Giap’s brilliance as a commander, aside from his great skill as a military tactician, was 
his understanding of the importance of political struggle as a major component of 
revolutionary warfare.33  Giap recognized that the masses, once fully mobilized, would 
constitute the ultimate weapon. Under his direction the political struggle (dau tranh) took 
advantage of a vast array of economic, psychological, and ideological weapons aimed at 
strengthening the resolve of friendly civilians and troops while converting their enemy 
counterparts. A key element of the Viet Minh’s dau tranh was to win the support of the 
people.34 
After defeating the French, President Ho Chi Minh shifted large numbers of Viet 
Minh troops to the eastern border of Laos to support the Laotian communist Pathet Lao. 
The North Vietnamese presence had two significant impacts: it expanded Ho’s 
communist influence on his neighbor to the west, and secured the eastern border of Laos 
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for use in creating supply lines running south to South Vietnam. The Viet Minh 
experience in Laos served as experimental grounds for testing new tactics and techniques 
to be used in insurgency. It also gave the Viet Minh forces an inside look at the UW 
techniques employed by the United States to win the support of the population. 
The United States perceived the potential loss of Laos to communist influence as 
a continuation of the domino effect. Prior to leaving the White House, President 
Eisenhower told Kennedy that “Laos was the key to the entire area of Southeast Asia.”35  
Before 1960, the United States’ involvement in Laos had been limited to a small 
contingent of “civilian” advisors training royal Laotian forces and a large military aid 
package which funded the entire Royal Lao Army (RLA) budget. The Program 
Evaluation Office, also known as Operation Hotfoot, was a covert effort begun in 1955 to 
train the RLA to fight against the Pathet Lao.36  Under Operation White Star in 1961, this 
role would expand to include large-scale covert support to anti-communist guerrilla 
forces, massive bombing of the area containing the Ho Chi Minh trail, and a civic action 
program which would shape the outcome of the war.37  As a supporting effort to the 
Vietnam War, these operations were indispensable. CIA veteran Richard Helms assessed 
that “Every attack on the Ho Chi Minh Trail diminished the supplies available to the 
North Vietnamese forces in South Vietnam,” and that “three of the best NVN combat 
divisions were tied down and under persistent guerrilla attacks in Laos.”38 
The RLA was composed of French-trained ethnic-Laotian soldiers. Laotians as a 
whole are not known for their warrior qualities. At the time they were described as a 
peace-loving people. The warrior race of the Laos were the Hmong, who reside in 
                                                 
35 Elliot Mai, RAND in Southeast Asia: A History of the Vietnam War Era (Santa Monica, CA: 
RAND Corporation, 2010), 541. 
36 Victor Holman, “Seminole Negro Indians, Macabees, and Civilian Irregulars: Models for the Future 
Employment of Indigenous Forces” (master’s thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 
1995) 44. 
37 D. Gareth Porter, “After Geneva: Subverting Laotian Neutrality,” in Laos: War and Revolution, ed. 
Nina S. Adams and Alfred W. McCoy (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1970), 182–183. 
38 Richard Helms, A Look Over My Shoulder; A Life in the Central Intelligence Agency  (New York, 
Random House, 2003), 255. 
 21
mountainous areas and trace their roots back to southern China.39  In 1960, the CIA 
began a program to recruit and train anti-communist guerrilla forces from among the 
Hmong tribesmen. These guerrillas would serve as surrogate forces through which the 
United States provided reconnaissance and harassing forces against the Viet Minh and 
Pathet Lao. One reason the Hmong had such success in fighting the Pathet Lao is because 
the Pathet Lao, like the Lao in the Royal Army, never had much of a taste for fighting.40  
The CIA also made use of large numbers of Thai and Filipino government troops, for 
limited air power, logistics, and combat forces. 
The United States’ effort at civic action during this period is best represented by 
one man who would spend a decade in Laos, living and working among the people. 
Edgar Buell was an Indiana farmer who was sent to Laos as a volunteer with the 
International Voluntary Services (IVS). His initial motivation to join the IVS was his 
desire to break a bout of depression after the loss of his wife.41  When he arrived in Laos 
in May 1960, the balance of power between the Communists and Neutralists hung 
precariously on who could win the support of the population. At the time Buell could not 
have imagined the impact he would have on the Laotian people or the influence he would 
leverage in the unconventional war being waged by the United States against communism 
in Southeast Asia. 
B. BRIEF HISTORY OF LAOS 
From 1893, until a brief Japanese occupation during World War II, Laos was a 
French protectorate. Following the fall of Japan in 1945, the country declared its 
independence, but the French under Charles de Gaulle re-asserted control. In 1950, Laos 
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Phouma became the democratically elected Prime Minister in 1951. France remained in 
de facto control until 22 October 1953, when Laos gained full independence under King 
Sisavang Vong.42 
While France had granted independence to Laos as a constitutional monarchy, the 
country was torn between competing political parties. During the Geneva Conference of 
1954, Democratic Republic of Vietnam Prime Minister Pham Van Dong demanded that 
the Pathet Lao, a Laotian communist party, be given a seat at the negotiating table. Dong 
later dropped his demand and proposed a complete ceasefire in Indochina and the 
partitioning of Laos into communist and nationalist sectors. The conference ended with 
an agreement for the withdrawal of Viet Minh forces from Laos, the retention of a modest 
French military training team by the RLA, and the understanding that no military alliance 
be formed between the United States and Laos. The United States Secretary of State, 
John Foster Dulles, acknowledged this agreement, but refused to sign the accords. One 
additional term of the agreement provided for two “regroupment zones” in Phong Saly 
and Sam Neua provinces adjacent to North Vietnam, to allow the Pathet Lao to assemble 
under the ceasefire. The provinces were to remain Pathet Lao held areas only until the 
next general election.43 
Tension between the royal government and the Pathet Lao flared immediately 
following the convention. The royal government contended that, it had the authority to 
exercise its functions anywhere in Laos, to include stationing royal troops in Phong Saly 
and Sam Neua provinces. The Pathet Lao held the view that they were entitled to exercise 
exclusive authority of the provinces until the general elections were held. Additionally, 
while the royal government maintained the position that the general election should be 
held in accordance with current laws, the Pathet Lao were of the belief that since they had 
not been represented at the National Assembly, they were not bound by the laws.44 
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The Pathet Lao boycotted the 1955 general elections and Souvanna Phouma was 
reelected Prime Minister. Subsequent negotiations between Phouma and his half-brother 
(and Pathet Lao leader), Souphanouvong, resulted in the formation of a coalition 
government in late 1957. With the communists and independents holding enough seats in 
parliament to block the royal government from attaining a two-thirds majority, the house 
became deadlocked. The National Assembly responded by confirming a right-wing 
government led by Phuy Xananikon in August 1958.45 
On August 9, 1960, Captain Kong Le led “Neutralist” forces in a successful coup 
d’état in the Laotian capital of Vientianne. With help from the King of Thailand, the 
CIA-backed Laotian cabinet minister, General Phoumi Nosavan, established a competing 
capital in Savannakhet. Phoumi’s forces attacked Vientiane on September 18, but the 
Neutralists, with the help of the Pathet Lao and the Soviets, repulsed the attack. A 
tripartite coalition government was formed between neutralists, communists, and rightists 
on November 18, 1960. On December 8, Souvanna Phouma removed Kong Le from the 
throne and made himself King, but the next day Kong Le deposed Souvanna Phouma and 
the leftist minister Quinim Pholsena was appointed Premier. On December 13, Phoumi 
began the Battle of Vientiane and, once victorious, installed Boun Oum as Premier. At 
this time, the country was divided, with a neutralist regime led by Souvanna Phouma 
based in the Plaine des Jarres and a U.S.-backed rightist regime in Vientianne under 
Oum. In 1961, John F. Kennedy’s administration opted for a neutralist coalition rather 
than risk an armed confrontation with the Russians over Laos, and Phoumi was ordered 
to merge his right-wing government into a tripartite coalition under the leadership of 
Souvanna Phouma.46 
C. GUERRILLA WARFARE AND CIVIC ACTION 
The Hmong people were an ethnic minority within Laos. They held a low position 
in society and had a very small presence within the RLA. The only Hmong officer within 
the RLA in 1960 was MAJ Vang Pao, a French-trained combat veteran with extensive 
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military experience. Vang Pao saw the potential for the Hmong to serve as a resistance 
force against the communist forces in support of Souvanna Phouma’s effort to establish a 
power base for the Royal Lao government. He had been quietly working to establish 
resistance networks by handing out weapons from the government armory to his fellow 
tribesmen.47  The CIA came to serve as advisors and financiers. 
At the time, Edgar Buell’s job with the IVS was to teach rural vocational skills to 
adults on an elementary level. The first thing Buell did on arriving in Laos was to learn a 
few perfunctory phrases in the local language and begin establishing a network of reliable 
local nationals. He focused considerable time and effort on learning local customs and 
traditions of the people. In addition to integrating with the locals, Buell built strong 
relationships with U.S. Army Special Forces soldiers, CIA personnel, and other members 
of the international community involved in the secret war in Laos. As his personal civic 
action program expanded in scale and scope, Buell avoided creating a bureaucratic 
structure which would likely fall prey to Parkinson’s Law.48  He did this by employing a 
small number of local nationals to handle the tasks associated with running a large-scale 
humanitarian support operation while maintaining a relatively flat hierarchy with a 
narrow span of control. 
Buell’s civic programs and Vang Pao’s military actions came to be intertwined. 
Neither activity could function without the other. The Hmong and Lao people relied 
equally on Buell’s rice and Vang Pao’s guns. Indeed, the relationship was so close that at 
times Buell lent direct support to the guerrilla forces by delivering relief supplies to 
isolated bands of Vang Pao’s fighters who were not able to reach friendly lines.49  This 
action reduced friction with the population by alleviating the need for Vang Pao’s 
guerrillas to burden the populace with material support. Buell came to see the struggle for 
Laos in terms of Cold War morality, as one between free world good and communist 
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evil.50  He understood from his study of the human terrain that winning the support of the 
Hmong people was the key to winning the fight against the communists. 
D. HOW MANY MEN DO YOU NEED IF YOU WANT TO MAKE A 
CHANGE? 
Buell was universally known in Laos as Tan Pop, which means “Mister Sent from 
Above.”  He is the most beloved American in the history of Laos. Besides becoming the 
face of America in Laos, he became intimately familiar with all the tribes across Laos, 
developing close personal relationships and a keen understanding of the tribal nature of 
the country. Within the first five years of his involvement in the war, he was responsible 
for partial or total support of 500,000 people.51  He brought about changes in sanitation 
habits, education programs, and cultural norms which endure today. 
Prior to providing any aid, Tan Pop conducted assessments of the capabilities and 
knowledge of the people he sought to help. He spent the first few weeks in-country 
traveling 18 hours a day to the villages within his area of responsibility. His perspective 
on giving assistance was “If you’re gonna [sic] help out in a country like this, you first 
got to find out what the people can do for themselves. The closer you can git [sic] to the 
lowest man out here, the quicker you find out what he needs.”  By meeting with the rural 
farmers, he was able to identify shortcomings in their tools and equipment. Instead of 
supplying tools to the farmers, Pop trained the villagers to make their own out of locally 
procured materials.  “They need steel points on their wooden plows, and their own 
blacksmiths are makin’ [sic] ’em [sic].”52  Pop had an instinctual understanding that in 
order to build a sense of independence and strength within a community, one must foster 
a sense of ownership and self-reliance. 
Within a month in-country, Pop realized that in order to help the people of Laos, 
he would have to expand his civic action role beyond his charter of vocational training. 
While performing his duties as technical advisor, he quickly identified weaknesses in 
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health and education programs that left the Hmong people vulnerable to the influence and 
control of communist Pathet Lao. Similarly, Vang Pao had been educated by the French 
at a young age and saw the importance of education for the future of the Hmong people. 
The Hmong never had their own schools; the only opportunity for education was to send 
a small number of children to Lao schools that were built and funded by the Pathet Lao. 
Buell leveraged his connections within the international aid community and the CIA to 
attain simple school supplies for the Hmong. He led local villagers in projects to build the 
first schools that had ever been built for Hmong children.53  This gave the Hmong an 
opportunity for education and helped break their reliance on the Pathet Lao. 
E. ENABLING A GUERRILLA FORCE THROUGH HUMANITARIAN 
ASSISTANCE 
Health problems were a major problem among the Hmong. In 1960, infant 
mortality rates were 70 percent. Pop found there was a critical shortage in trained medical 
personnel. In concert with U.S. Special Forces medics, he identified a small number of 
candidates from among the Hmong and Lao people and erected a medical training school 
at Pho Khao. The nurse training program was a quick success.54  Within two years, his 
program trained more than 100 simple practitioners from all ethnic groups and placed 
them strategically around the northeast, thereby bringing crude but regular medical 
attention to the area for the first time. Vang Pao’s guerrilla force benefitted directly from 
the increase in morale thanks to improved medical care they and their families received. 
Perhaps the greatest measure of effectiveness of the nursing program was the infant 
mortality rate, which dropped sharply within two years to just over 30 percent, still a far 
cry from the U.S. infant mortality rate of .025% at the time.55  Also under Buell’s 
initiative, a 100-bed hospital facility was built at Sam Thong.56 
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Pop’s medical program paid dividends in August 1963 when a cholera epidemic 
broke out in lowland rural areas. This epidemic, if untreated, threatened the Hmong 
guerrillas who were now the main source of resistance against the communist forces. 
Buell was able to leverage his influence within the CIA and State Department to bring the 
cholera vaccine in from Thailand overnight.57  Over the course of two weeks, Pop’s 
medics immunized more than 15,000 lowland, mid-slope, and mountain dwellers, 
including hundreds from threatened Pathet Lao villages.58  This outreach by anti-
communist forces displayed a willingness and capacity by the Royal Government of 
Souvanna Phouma to aid the people of Laos regardless of their ethnicity or political 
loyalties.59 
Tan Pop’s civic action programs had a strong impact on Vang Pao and the CIA’s 
recruitment efforts. By providing emergency relief, and agricultural and vocational 
training to the Hmong tribesmen, Pop effectively freed up thousands of military age 
males to join the guerrilla force. Within two years, many of the 125,000 Hmong for 
whom he cared had become self-sufficient, tilling new farms across the area.60  Just as 
important, this population was now actively and lethally engaging Vietnamese forces in 
Laos and along the border on the all-important Ho Chi Minh Trail.   
F. SAVING THE SEA THROUGH POPULACE AND RESOURCE 
CONTROL 
As the war intensified, Pop focused considerable effort on refugee relief. He was 
an ever-present leader during countless evacuations of villages under direct attack from 
the enemy. Over the course of his time in Laos, he personally led 70,000 Laotian refugees 
to safety when their villages were attacked by communist forces.61  As quickly and 
efficiently as possible, he would move the evacuees to a safe area, take a head count of 
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the remaining personnel, and call for aerial delivery of relief supplies through the CIA-
run Air America. Vang Pao relied heavily on Pop’s refugee program. While Pao moved 
his units like chess pieces, sweeping to the sides, leaping over pockets of the enemy in 
the mountains, Pop functioned like his bishop, following behind with immediate aid for 
the civilian populace in the newly seized areas.62 
Refugee evacuation became a prime method for winning or maintaining the 
support of the population. Vang Pao followed Mao’s ideology that the people are the sea 
and his guerrillas were the fish that needed the sea to survive. Vang Pao knew that as 
long as Pop supported the people, the people would support his guerrillas. A large part of 
Vang Pao’s strategy involved the safeguarding and movement of refugees.  “If the people 
are the sea, then let’s hurry the tide south,” he said. Vang Pao and Pop came up with a 
plan to move every native who was willing to disrupt his traditional geographical ties 
more than a hundred miles south where the area was more secure. Because of its optional 
nature however, this operation was not a military success, as many Hmong were left 
behind because the opted to stay, or were held in place by communist forces. Ironically, 
at least two villages of Pathet Lao did end up being moved south because they did not 
understand that they could remain behind if they liked. They liked the security and their 
new lease on life so much that they changed allegiances.63 
G. INFLUENCING SOCIETY THROUGH LEADERSHIP AND INITIATIVE 
The high stature that Pop earned among the Laotian people lent him immense 
credibility and the moral authority to alter traditional taboos. For instance, while 
conducting a visit to a small Hmong village, Pop encountered a young Hmong man 
whose left hand was hanging by strings of rotten flesh. Pop explained that the arm was 
infected with gangrene and the arm would have to be removed. The tribal shaman told 
him that amputation was not possible because the spirits would not permit it. Pop 
patiently explained to the young man, the shaman, and village elders that the man would 
die if the arm was not removed. They begrudgingly allowed Pop to amputate the arm. 
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The man lived, as did the other three dozen amputees operated on by the Indiana farmer 
during his decade in the mountains of Laos.64 
In an early refugee evacuation, Pop led 9,000 evacuees out of danger, but they 
were still pursued by the communists. When they came to a shallow river, the followers 
refused to cross. Under small arms and mortar fire, an elder explained to Pop that it was 
forbidden for the Hmong people to wet the body above the knees or below the shoulders 
at this time of year; spirits of the water would make them sick. Frustrated, Pop told them 
they could stay and die or take their chances in crossing. He convinced the elders to cross 
with him and the rest of the group followed. This event represented a watershed moment 
in tribal history because for centuries the Hmong had suffered from unnecessary diseases 
of the skin and internal organs caused entirely by their refusal to bathe except at very 
special times of the year.65  Thanks to Buell's ability to improve field sanitation practices 
the combat readiness of Vang Pao’s guerrilla force also improved. 
It was through necessity that Pop broke the long standing Hmong taboo against 
women providing medical aid. After one extremely harrowing evacuation, Pop found 
himself with 25,000 refugees in need of medical attention. With a shortage of medics, he 
called for a team of young female nurse trainees to be brought forward to assist. When 
Vang Pao arrived to inspect the camp, he was so impressed with the results that he said 
“It was good that they volunteered to help. It is time for customs to change among my 
people.” Vang Pao saw the utility in using the nurses as a resource and added “Some, 
perhaps, will even work with my soldiers.”66 
H. GIVE A MAN A FISH, HE EATS FOR A DAY…GIVE HIM 2,000 FISH, 
HE WILL EAT FOR GENERATIONS 
Pop sought to improve the dietary habits of the refugees he worked with. Protein 
scarcity caused malnutrition and disease. Pop’s introduction of steel tipped plows had an 
instant effect on the farmers’ ability to till land in preparation for planting. His 
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introduction of row-planting methods also increased the rural farmers’ effectiveness and 
production rates.67  As previously mentioned, by teaching efficient farming techniques he 
lowered the labor requirements of the villages and freed up military aged males to join 
Vang Pao’s guerrillas. As an example of how Pop tackled problems more specifically 
related to protein, take the black razorback pig that is native to Laos. Despite its small 
size, boney frame, and lack of meat and fat, it had been for centuries the only pig that the 
people raised and consumed. Although people had recognized that pigs were a good 
source of protein, no one had introduced a viable alternative. Pop took the initiative to 
order 60 hefty Yorkshire pigs from Thailand. The Hmong were delighted by the rotund 
pigs and the resulting cross-breed leaped from bone to fat in one generation. By 1970, 
there were more mixed-breed pigs in Laos than there were razorbacks before the war 
started.68 
A second venture to boost the supply of protein came with Pop’s introduction of 
farm-raised fish to the locals. While native Laotians did have a taste for fish, the ponds, 
rivers, and streams of the mountainous country had never produced much in the way of 
aquatic life. Again, Pop introduced a new species into Laos by importing 2,000 tilapia 
from Thailand. Within three months, the Hmong and Lao people were actively harvesting 
all the fish they needed from ponds. Today, in Laos, even where there is no chicken or 
pork, even the poorest of people have fish to rely on.69        
While Pop generally had overwhelming success, he did fall short on some 
occasions. One such instance was his effort to curb the dependence of rural farmers on 
the opium trade. Pop invested much time and some of his own money to introduce sweet 
potatoes as an alternative crop. He did so based on results of a soil study and because 
sweet potatoes could yield two harvests a year as opposed to the single annual harvest of 
poppy. This would also have provided a sustainable source of protein to the Laotian 
people. Unfortunately, there was no way to get a profitable amount of potatoes to any 
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market. The farmers who took Pop’s advice lost out on a year of opium production and 
gained an overabundance of sweet potatoes.70 
I. CONCLUSION 
Everything turns in time, and it’ll turn again in Laos, some day. Maybe it’s 
turnin’ now, maybe it’ll be ten years or fifty years before there’s peace. 
But when that day comes, these people is gonna remember what Tan Pop 
stood for, whether they remember me or not. They’ll be just a little better 
off for my bein’ there, and that’s the only thing that keeps me goin’.71 
—Edgar Buell 
Civic action had a profound effect on the fight against communist influence in 
Laos from 1960 until the United States finally withdrew all aid and support to guerrillas 
in 1973. In the later years of U.S. involvement in the war, the communists adopted many 
of the same civic action techniques which Pop was employing. On several occasions, 
Vang Pao’s guerrillas found caches of blankets, rice, and school books in Pathet Lao and 
Viet Minh bases. 72  Clearly, communists had taken note of the overwhelming effects that 
civic action was having on tilting the balance of popular support in favor of the anti-
communists. Buell’s efforts contributed to the campaign in Laos, denying supplies being 
ferried along the Ho Chi Minh trail system and assisting the Hmong people to help tie 
down three entire divisions of NVA troops on the periphery of the Vietnam war.   
Even after the American withdrawal, Edgar Buell stayed on in Laos to continue 
his relief efforts until May 10, 1975 when he finally agreed to leave at the urging of 
friends. His safety was in jeopardy as he had become the symbol of American 
interference as far as the Pathet Lao were concerned, and they now occupied Vientiane.73  
Edgar Buell’s successes in Laos are an example for how civic action conducted at the 
tactical level can have strategic effects in a UW environment.  His efforts helped keep the 
Hmong on their feet and fighting, even in a losing cause. As a senior U.S. diplomat wrote 
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of Buell, “his grasp of the microeconomics of refugee resettlement and rehabilitation is of 
a high order. His handling of the unusual representational responsibilities of his position 
in the shadow of the battle line is equally good. Second only to Vang Pao, another living 
legend, Tan Pop’s word is holy writ in the Meo [Hmong] country.”74 
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IV. MUQTADA AL SADR; CIVIC ACTION IN SUPPORT OF 
RESISTANCE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In the aftermath of the American invasion of Iraq in 2003, Shia Iraqis found 
themselves in a position to finally seize the political power that their greater percentage 
of the population numbers warranted. Several Shia and Sunni organizations waged small-
scale insurgent warfare against the U.S. occupation and its Iraqi allies. Some fell under 
the umbrella of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and waged an ideological war. Some 
rose from disbanded Baathist organizations, waging a counter-coup to expel the 
American occupiers. Still others built upon existing internal and external links to 
mobilize local geographic and sectarian-based populations to gain their own political 
power in the emerging democracy. This chapter will highlight Muqtada al-Sadr’s 
effective employment of civic action and social movement theory techniques to create a 
political base within the Shia population that helped his party incorporate itself into the 
Iraqi political process and become a power player.  
Muqtada al-Sadr is perhaps best known as the leader of the Shia guerrilla 
organization Jaish al-Mahdi, or the Mahdi Army. This organization was often described 
by media sources and Coalition authorities as a violent insurgent group bent on the 
expulsion of the U.S.-led occupation forces following the fall of Saddam Hussein. While 
the Mahdi Army’s military actions did play a significant role in the post-invasion 
insurgency, this chapter will focus on Muqtada al-Sadr’s use of networks and civic action 
to establish a Shadow Government and mobilize the Shia population into a mass 
movement organization under the banner of the Sadrist party.  
B. RECENT HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
Iraq is composed of a Shia majority, representing 60–65% of the population.75   
Until the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, government control was maintained by the 
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mostly-Sunni Baathist party. At the time of the 2003 invasion, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-
Sistani was the preeminent Shia cleric in Iraq.76  He was one of the few senior Shia 
leaders to survive the Saddam regime and remain in Iraq. Following the U.S. invasion, a 
political vacuum opened when the Baath party was outlawed by the Coalition Provincial 
Authority under Administrator Paul Bremer. This gap in authority provided Shia political 
groups the opportunity to vie for control of the population. Immediately following the 
invasion, political groups such as the Dawa party and Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq 
(SCIRI), that had gone into exile during Saddam’s rule, returned to Iraq.77  Unbeknownst 
to these parties, there was also a local contender anxious to fill the political void. 
Muqtada al-Sadr was relatively unknown prior to the 2003 U.S. invasion, 
although he came from one of the most prominent religious families in Iraq. His ancestry 
can be traced directly back to the Prophet Mohammad’s daughter, Fatima. He was the 
fourth son of revered Shia cleric Mohammad Sadiq al-Sadr, who had been an opponent to 
Saddam. Sadiq became a symbol of Shia oppression, but was elevated to the status of a 
martyr following his assassination by Saddam in 1999. Muqtada benefited from the 
reputation of his family’s name and the credibility he earned thanks to remaining in Iraq 
after his father’s murder. His having remained living among his fellow Shia helped him 
quickly establish a base of power following the regime’s overthrow. But, he lacked his 
father’s religious scholarly credentials. Nor could he match those of the leaders of the 
Dawa and SCIRI parties. However, what Muqtada lacked in actual religious 
qualifications, he made up for with fervor and political savvy. The fact that he was not 
part of the established Shia clergy actually made him more appealing to many 
impoverished young Shia. 
Muqtada had a strategic vision for his movement which he openly disclosed in a 
2005 interview with Al Jezeera.78  His plan was three-phased. First, it involved 
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mobilizing the disenfranchised Shia population through protests to instill a sense of unity. 
The second phase entailed military action to be carried out by his Mahdi Army. The third 
and final phase was political action which he would achieve through joining the Iraqi 
political process. And indeed, as he envisioned, at the peak of the Sadrist movement, 
Muqtada was able to rouse the support of the Shia population and hold demonstrations 
with tens of thousands of protestors at multiple locations.79  He fielded a 60,000-man 
army which was able to effectively maintain control of several Iraqi cities against 
Coalition and Iraqi forces.80  Finally, his Sadrist party was able to win 32 out of 130 
United Iraqi Alliance seats in the December 2005 Iraqi parliamentary election.81 
The extent to which Muqtada’s name recognition helped his success cannot be 
underestimated. In fact, he did not start the Sadrist movement, but used his family name 
to co-opt the Sadrist party brand which dates back to the 1970s when it was established as 
“a mixture of Islamic revivalism, nationalism, and populism [with] a deep appeal to 
angry, alienated, but terrorized young Shia men.”82  To review just a bit more of the 
family’s history, the Sadr family is one of the two dominant Shia families within Iraq. 
Muqtada is not just the son of Grand Ayatollah Mohammad Sadiq al-Sadr, but also the 
son-in-law of Grand Ayatollah Mohammad Baqir al-Sadr. Baqir, known as Sadr I, was 
himself the son of a well-respected high-ranking Shi’a cleric and the ideological founder 
of Islamic Dawa Party. His lineage, too, reportedly goes back to Muhammad (through the 
seventh Shia Imam). Following Baqir’s execution by Saddam Hussein, the family name 
was carried on by his cousin, Mohammad Sadiq al-Sadr, known as Sadr II. Sadr II was 
known for his calls for government reform. He cautiously walked the line between 
confrontation with and submission to Saddam. The regime was hesitant to eliminate him 
because he was able to control the Shia masses and they most likely feared an uprising in 
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response to an assassination. Sadiq successfully established a network of preachers and 
organizers to revive the Shia masses in Baghdad and southern Iraq. The growth of his 
popularity, among those who often referred to themselves as the “followers of the Vocal 
Hawza,” developed into a mass popular movement which attracted the poor and 
deprived.83  This large following also put him in competition with other Shia leaders 
including Ayatollah Mohammed Baqir al-Hakim who was exiled in Iran.84  In February 
1999, Saddam had had enough of Sadiq’s quiet independence. Sadiq and his two eldest 
sons were assassinated on their way home from the Kufa mosque in Najaf. Saddam never 
claimed responsibility for the killings and even went so far as to execute four 
“foreigners” for the crime.85  The killings inspired a short, unorganized uprising which 
was quickly suppressed by Iraqi security forces and soon the Shia masses returned to 
their lives of quiet repression. 
Muqtada maintained a low profile following the assassination of his father and 
brothers. He was wise enough to realize that there was no reward in taking a public stand 
against Saddam. In fact, he went so far as to send a letter formally thanking the regime 
for its sympathy. Over the next four years, he worked as editor-in-chief of a Sadrist 
magazine called al-Huda, which had been established in 1997 when the Baathist regime 
had confidence that the movement was working in its interest.86  Although little is 
officially known of Muqtada’s activities, it is believed that he served as the dean of a 
religious university set up by his father in Najaf and was responsible for security in al-
Thawra (later named Sadr city).87  While Muqtada remained under constant surveillance 
by Iraqi security forces, his positions would have given him access to a large number of 
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young Shia from poor neighborhoods. This explains to some degree his ability to raise 
large numbers of volunteers in short order when the opportunity arose in 2003. 
Following the regime’s fall, Muqtada was quick to take action. His initial success 
likely had a lot to do with proximity. He was properly positioned within the Shia 
community to quickly organize supporters as soon as the regime began to disintegrate 
and while many Shia rivals were still in exile abroad. Tellingly, one religious rival, 
Sayyid Majid al-Khoei, returned to Najaf from Britain on April 9, 2003, only to be 
brutally hacked to death by Sadr supporters.88  Not only was this not the peaceful 
transition to a post-Saddam Iraq that most had hoped for, but it marked the start of a 
violent struggle between Shia factions that would last the next few years. 
C. MASS MOBILIZATION AND CIVIC ACTION IN SUPPORT OF THE 
RESISTANCE 
Muqtada wasted no time in activating the latent networks he had developed over 
the years since his father’s death. Again, he was able to quickly activate a web of 
supporters before any of his rivals had time to react.89  By exploiting the Sadr family 
name, he tapped his father’s vast network of charities, schools, and mosques and 
integrated them with his own significant popular following. This meant most of the 
resources available to the Shia community were under his tentative control. He 
immediately focused efforts on establishing a name for himself as a source of stability 
and leadership for the Shia community. Within a week of Saddam going into hiding, the 
Sadrists had 50,000 volunteers organized in east Baghdad, performing public services 
such as collecting trash, directing traffic, and distributing food to hospitals.90  This 
localized version of a Shadow Government gave Sadr the legitimacy and public support 
that he needed to sustain and build his opposition movement.   
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While material resources were limited and he had established no formal structure 
of control, Muqtada was in touch with about fifteen religious sheikhs on legitimate 
matters during the final days of Saddam’s rule.91  This gave him a core of local leaders 
through whom he was able to generate a cadre of supporters that enabled him to exercise 
control and communicate his strategic message. He immediately set up Sadrist offices in 
poor neighborhoods and established committees charged with restoring civil order and 
social stability. A key action that played to his favor was the reopening of several 
mosques which had been closed by Saddam. Muqtada also urged Shia to make the 
Arba’in pilgrimage to Karbala as his father had done before his death, but later canceled 
for fear of reprisal by Saddam. Muqtada’s influence with the people can be seen in the 
3,000,000 pilgrims some estimate made the journey.92  At this point in time (April, 
2003), Muqtada was not openly seeking a political role himself, but was supportive of the 
Dawa party under the leadership of Ayatollah al-Ha’eri in Iran. 
Mass looting was rampant after Saddam’s fall. This led to a breakdown in the 
infrastructure as utilities were disrupted by thieves stealing power transformers, light 
fixtures, and such. The rampant looting also posed an ethical dilemma for many who 
viewed it amoral.   While Sadrist clerics did manage to recover stolen property through 
amnesty programs set up to restore most basic services, Muqtada was less decisive about 
the issue of looting iteslf. In an effort to co-opt the looters but not alienate the clerics, he 
issued the al-Hawasim fatwa which allowed looters to hold onto their expropriated items 
as long as they made a donation of one-fifth of the value to their local Sadrist office.93 
The competition for control among the Shia began quickly. The first sign of a 
disjointed Shia front was the murder of al-Khoei. A further division between factions 
surfaced when angry Sadrist mobs besieged Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani’s house and 
unsuccessfully demanded his return to Iran.94  What role Muqtada himself played in this 
action is unknown, but it pointed to fractures within the Shia community. Within weeks, 
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Mohammed Bakir al-Hakim of the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq 
returned to Iraq from Iran. In July, the 25-member Iraqi Interim Governing Council 
(IGC) was formed as the United States tried to develop an interim authority that would 
have legitimacy in Iraq and abroad, appease the population, and deflect criticism from the 
occupation forces.95  The Sadrists were noticeably excluded from any representation in 
this new governing body. Muqtada would benefit from this exclusion as he craftily seized 
the narrative, pitting the illegitimacy of the new regime against his benevolent and 
effective popular movement. 
D. LASHING DEEDS AND WORDS TOGETHER 
Muqtada used several narratives to structure his opposition to rival Shia groups. 
His struggle to win “the battle of the story” is a case study in how resistance movements 
contend with the government for the people’s opinion. He shrewdly used the four basic 
framing strategies that social movement theorist and Islamic radicalization scholar 
Quintan Wiktorowicz identifies as relevant to the credibility of popular intellectuals. 
They are: vilification, exaltation, credentialing, and “decredentialing.”96    Muqtada 
opposed the IGC and publicly vilified the Council on the basis that it was appointed by an 
illegal, external governing body that had no authority over the people of a sovereign 
nation. He vilified SCIRI, Dawa, and other secular Iraqi parties as supporters of an 
illegitimate occupation force. In direct opposition to these parties, Moqtada elevated his 
Sadrist movement, exalting it as the embodiment of Iraqi independence and nationalism. 
By attacking the credibility of members of the IGC and magnifying his own 
organization’s legitimacy, he effectively “decredentialized” his rivals while 
“credentializing” his own movement. 
To add to his narrative, Muqtada tied the argument against his Shia opponents to 
historical events which highlighted perceived past transgressions against the Shia 
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community, such as the 1991 Shia intifada, in which the SCIRI and Dawa parties failed 
to enter Iraq from Iran in support of the popular uprising against Saddam. This reminder 
reinforced the argument that these parties did not stand for the interests of Iraqi 
nationalists, but instead represented foreigners trying to seize the opportunity to exert 
influence within Iraq. The bridging of these arguments fit well with the logic of the 
poverty stricken and uneducated masses, especially since it described clear pattern of 
disassociation by elite Shia organizations. In Muqtada’s view these unreliable 
opportunists included Sistani, who had failed to step forward to take an active role in the 
1991 rebellion. 
Muqtada drew distinctions not only with opposing Shia factions, but also with 
Sunnis. While there had long been tensions between Sunni and Shia in Iraq, Saddam had 
controlled the animosity between the groups. Muqtada used this long-established rivalry 
to further solidify his message that he and his followers belonged to a community that 
had been oppressed and they needed to seize this opportunity to rise up and assert 
themselves as a revolutionary movement that was entitled to govern Iraq.  
The primary grievance used by the Sadrist movement was the occupation of Iraq 
following Saddam’s fall. The group took the clearly expressed position that all foreign 
occupational forces must leave Iraq immediately and let Iraqis rebuild their country on 
their own. Muqtada was openly defiant. AS he put it, “the smaller devil has gone but the 
bigger devil has come.”97  To further drive home his point, he instilled a sense of passion 
among his supporters by drawing the association between the United States and Israel. 
This well-crafted linkage gave weight to his call to resist the Coalition as it was an 
alliance made up of Iraq’s common enemies, come to occupy the country. 
With the widespread belief among Iraqis that the Coalition forces were there to 
occupy their homeland, resistance was the logical next step. Muqtada was able to 
coalesce his supporters around his call for Shia independence under his Sadrist movement 
even as they opposed other Shia groups whom he accused of cooperating with the 
Coalition. Within two months of Saddam’s fall, Muqtada had amassed a following that 
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consisted of most of the Shia in central Iraq. The SCIRI and Dawa parties were branded 
traitors for aligning themselves with the U.S.-led occupation. Still, even Muqtada was 
able to maintain control of his followers and deter any large-scale violence as he stoked 
hostility among Shia. 
E. BUILDING COMPLEXITY IN THE COALITION 
While Muqtada initially used his disassociation from Iran to his advantage while 
accruing popular support and portraying his opponents as pawns in a larger Iranian 
scheme, he soon realized he needed money and resources. In June 2003, he began talking 
about creating his own militia. To do so, he would need support. Out of necessity, he took 
the calculated risk of losing credibility as an independent nationalist leader by quietly 
reaching out to Iran for funding and supplies.98  It was with this support that he was able 
to start laying the groundwork for what would later become the biggest armed group 
opposed to the Coalition occupational forces. 
Muqtada’s greatest strength was his resonance with the masses of poor Shia, long 
oppressed under the Baathist regime. He possessed the ability to organize protests and 
demonstrations that drew tens of thousands of people. He used his Friday prayer sessions 
to whip up religious fervor for his vision of a Sadrist-led independent, nationalist Iraq. He 
followed his father’s example by delivering the message that the poor had been 
disenfranchised by the establishment and property-owning elite, a message that 
reverberated with the majority. Over the course of several months, his movement gained 
enough momentum to warrant the attention of top Coalition leaders. CPA Administrator 
Paul Bremer later reflected on his thoughts that “Muqtada al-Sadr has the potential of 
ripping this country apart.”99    
F. SHADOW GOVERNMENT DEVELOPMENT 
To further legitimize the Sadrists as a source of social stability, Muqtada publicly 
declared his establishment of a Shadow Government. In October 2003, he held a 
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conference at which he proclaimed the creation of an alternate Iraqi government, to 
include Ministries of interior, finance, justice, information, and foreign affairs. The 
Ministers, drawn from among his most loyal supports, immediately opened offices to 
begin executing their administrative responsibilities. Muqtada’s power base was in the 
impoverished slums. His movement used civic action to win the loyalty of the Shia 
community by providing welfare services in poor neighborhoods.   Kurdish journalist and 
experienced Iraq observer Nir Rosen wrote, “At one time the Sadrists were probably also 
the largest humanitarian organization in Iraq, providing sustainable assistance to more 
Iraqis than anybody else.”100 
In the absence of a functioning public judicial system, the Sadrists implemented 
rule of law by standing up local courts, such as the rudimentary facility run out of Hikma 
mosque in Sadr city.101  Sadr’s magistrates provided a sense of order in an otherwise 
lawless time. However, while offering a level of protection to some, their assertions of 
authority did trigger dissatisfaction on the part of the secular political parties and deepened 
the division between the Sadrists and other opposing Shia organizations. 
G. SPREADING THE WORD 
The Sadrist revolutionaries had several avenues by which they were able to spread 
their message of revolt and further add to their air of legitimacy. Friday prayers were the 
primary vehicle by which Muqtada communicated with his followers. He carefully 
scripted his sermons in advance and distributed copies to mosques for transmission at the 
weekly prayer gatherings. Another effective technique was the Sadrist newspaper,  
al-Hawza. The publication was so widely seen as a source of information for the 
revolution that the CPA had it shut down in March 2004.102  This action only reinforced 
the movement’s claim to victimhood, and strengthened its arguments about foreign and  
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internal repression. Muqtada capitalized on this opportunity to prove that the occupation 
was illegitimate by not only crafting a message of repression, but comparing the 
Coalition to Saddam’s regime. 
While Muqtada effectively used civic action to gain substantial momentum, 
effectively mobilized the populace, and established a Shadow Government, he was 
premature in shifting his efforts toward a war of mobilization. By March 2004, he had a 
sizeable militia which he was using to maintain security and enforce the Shadow 
Government’s authority within Sadrist-held areas. While the militia was originally 
established to employ “peaceful means” of resistance against the occupation, he did not 
rule out armed attacks.103  Open warfare between the Mahdi Army and Coalition forces 
finally broke out on April 4, 2004 when Muqtada’s forces seized and held terrain across 
southern Iraq. This Sadrist revolt was short lived, as Coalition forces launched an 
offensive in late April that ended any hope he may have had of achieving a decisive 
military victory. The defeat of the Mahdi Army, combined with a political aggreement 
between the Coalition authority and other Shia leaders, effectively staunched Muqtada’s 
ability to attain a monopoly of Shia support.104 
H. CONCLUSION 
While the Mahdi Army is easily seen as a failure when viewed as a military force, 
Muqtada did effectively use the militia to support the establishment of a political base 
that would endure among the poor and disenfranchised Shia. His movement won almost 
25% of the parliamentary seats in the 2005 elections. By effectively building on existing 
social movement networks built 20 years earlier by his father-in-law, Muqtada made up 
for his shortcomings in experience and scholarly credentials. His confidence and 
understanding of how to win his people’s support brought in allies from the broader Shia 
community and his effective administrative skills kept them there through the tough and 
often violent times.   
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Although Muqtada gained significant political capital by winning the support of 
the Shia community and asserting himself as the leader of the oppressed, and then 
squandered it by moving too quickly into the mobilization phase of his insurgent 
campaign, he did win and retain a seat at the bargaining table. Unconventional Warfare 
practitioners can take many lessons from his successes and failures, but perhaps the most 
significant learning point is how to employ civic actions to win the support of the 
population. From a UW point of view, Muqtada al-Sadr coordinated three distinct but 
inseparable lines of effort: Shadow Government, Mass Movement, and Guerrilla 
Warfare. His humanitarian, administrative, and bureaucratic efforts added up to a base of 
massive popular support. Where this existed, it enabled him to build a substantial army, 
worthy of external support and very troubling to the Coalition and its Iraqi partners. If 
only Sadr had had the benefit of a more mature, objective mentor, the Sadrist movement 










V. THE TALIBAN’S USE OF CIVIC ACTION IN SUPPORT OF 
ITS INSURGENCY 
When a country is being subverted it is not being outfought; it is being 
out-administered.105  
—Bernard B. Fall 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Conventional wisdom tells us that the goal of an insurgency is to win the support 
of the population. According to the U.S. Army’s Counterinsurgency manual, “The 
primary struggle in an internal war is to mobilize people in a struggle for political control 
and legitimacy. Insurgents and counterinsurgents seek to mobilize popular support for 
their cause.”106  In order for an insurgent organization to gain legitimacy in the eyes of 
the population, it helps to demonstrate that it has the capacity to govern within its 
occupied territory. Therefore, addressing the population’s grievances is one of the 
primary objectives of a wise insurgent organization and requires sufficient attention, 
support, and resources. 
B. HISTORY 
While the Taliban was an insurgent organization from its earliest days, it was not 
always the influential force that it is today. Its rise to power can be seen almost as a 
heroic tale if viewed through the lens of the underdog. Its origins can be traced back to 
the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989. Afghanistan was in a state of instability 
after a decade of war and being held together by a crumbling communist regime headed 
by Mohammad Najibullah. Warlords ended Najibullah’s rule in April 1992, then 
continued to fight a series of battles for their piece of power in the fractured country. 
Despite the presence of strong leaders such as Burhanuddin Rabbani and Ahmad Shah 
Massoud, the Islamic State of Afghanistan established under the 1992 Peshawar Accord 
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was not able to maintain control. In the years of turmoil that followed Najibullah’s fall, 
the situation can be best described as a state of “complete anarchy.”107 
C. THE RISE TO POWER 
The Taliban arose as an entity that offered stability and an alternative to the 
incessant fighting of the warlords. The Taliban movement was reportedly born under the 
leadership of Mullah Omar, a one-eyed former mujahedeen fighter, in 1994 in the city of 
Kandahar.108  Beginning with a group of fewer than 50 armed madrassa pupils, he used 
charisma and religious ideology to motivate a rag-tag band of religious students to 
embark on a mission to disarm rival militias, enforce Islamic laws, and retain all areas 
which they “liberated.”109  The organization was governed by a strict and anti-modern 
ideology which combined Sharia with the traditional tribal Pashtunwali code.110  The 
Taliban’s brand of social order was welcomed at first, but eventually alienated a large 
segment of the population through an increasingly extremist dogma that outlawed such 
things as music, kite flying, required all males to wear beards, and restricted the liberties 
of women. 
Over the course of the next two years, Mullah Omar and his Taliban did what they 
had originally set out to do. They occupied and held terrain, took power from the local 
warlords, and implemented Sharia. By April 1996, the Taliban had taken control of a 
large portion of the country, including the capital of Kabul. While a World War I-like 
stalemate existed with the warring factions, Mullah Omar delivered what Ahmed Rashid 
describes as a “political masterstroke” when he wrapped himself in the Cloak of the 
Prophet Mohammed and assumed the right to lead not just all Afghans, but all 
Muslims.111 
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From this point, the story of the Taliban takes a turn for the worse. While they had 
amassed a large following, removed the Islamic State of Afghanistan from the seat of 
power, and held most of the terrain, they were about to cut short the honeymoon period 
by enforcing their extreme interpretation of Sharia. Shortly after seizing control, the 
Taliban began to alienate themselves from most Afghan communities. When the Taliban 
took control of an area, they imposed a Taliban governor to rule it. This disrupted the 
local equilibrium, a delicate balance maintained through a traditional tribal system that 
had been in place for centuries. They also perpetrated atrocities against the population 
and destroyed ancient cultural monuments.112 
D. THE FALL 
While many human rights watch groups attempted to call attention to the violence 
taking place under the Taliban’s rule, it was still largely ignored by the western world. 
Where the Taliban did make a fatal mistake was with the decision to grant sanctuary to 
Islamist extremist organizations, brought together by al-Qaeda. The 9–11 attacks on the 
United States finally brought the world’s attention to Afghanistan. The Taliban made the 
grave decision to continue to provide al-Qaeda safe haven following the 9–11 attacks, 
which brought down on it the wrath of the United States and partner nations. Rather than 
mounting a massive invasion, the United States and its allies went with a smaller force 
package, and relied on arming and supporting the Taliban’s traditional enemies. By 
December 2001, the Taliban had been ousted from power and was on the run. A U.S.-
dominated international committee installed a liberal democratic government under the 
leadership of Hamid Karzai. 
E. RISE FROM THE ASHES 
Although the Taliban was ousted from power, it was never eliminated. One can 
argue that the organization was defeated, but the ideology was never extinguished. Since 
its removal from power, the Taliban has remained a thorn in the side of both the Karzai 
administration and the U.S.-led Coalition. While some would argue that the Taliban has 
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splintered into aligned groups each of which pursues its own goals with intermittent 
cooperation or direction from Mullah Omar and traditional leaders, several themes 
remain consistent. Among them are the demands for: withdrawal of all foreign forces, 
establishment of law and order in accordance with Sharia, the legitimate exercise of 
power through an Islamic government, nationwide conformity with perceived Islamic 
social rules, and peace and security.113  The Taliban has successfully framed its 
objectives via existing religious, historical, and cultural values in order to maintain a 
collective identity among its supporters and to restore its legitimacy. 
F. EXPLOITING ADVANTAGES   
While the Taliban has not achieved a decisive victory in Afghanistan by any 
definition, it has managed to conduct a protracted war against Afghan and Coalition 
forces. It continues to maintain a significant presence within Afghanistan and the 
Pakistan border area. Although it is no match militarily for a head-to-head fight with 
Coalition forces, it does enjoy several advantages. The degree to which it has failed to 
use these advantages effectively in a decisive manner may reflect a lack of both strategic 
coordination and conceptual understanding of how to leverage its advantages against the 
government in a significant manner. 
The Taliban’s inherent understanding of the population and the cultural dynamics 
of Afghanistan give it a distinct home field advantage over foreign troops when it comes 
to gaining the support of the population and achieving information superiority. On 
several occasions, the Taliban has exploited this gap in capabilities through the use of 
propaganda against the Afghan government and Coalition forces. It has employed an 
effective information campaign, labeling the Karzai administration as a corrupt and 
ineffective puppet regime controlled by foreign powers. A 2010 survey conducted in 
Kandahar Province showed that 63 percent of respondents agreed that systematic 
corruption makes them look for alternatives to the current government.114 
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The Taliban has employed the technique of socialization to gain participation of 
social and tribal networks, building narratives that support its movement and survival. 
These narratives build and solidify identities and shape individuals’ cognitive frames. 
The Taliban has been able to define a set of options that includes it as a viable option for 
governance. It has created a perceived reality in which it is able to frame its insurgency in 
such a way that the populace sees it as a legitimate alternative to the Karzai 
government.115  For example, the Taliban has successfully labeled the struggle against the 
Karzai administration as a competition between tribal factions. This message resonates 
with the Afghan populace as there is a tradition of rivalry between the Ghilzai and 
Durrani tribes dating back to the 18th century.116  As a 2012 RAND report points out, 
“President Karzai’s Popalzai nepotism has alienated the rival Ghilzai tribe.”117  The 
Taliban use the issue of tribal differences to proffer emotionally and symbolically laden 
messages which gains support from and mobilizes followers, and attracts fence sitters.118 
G. MOBILIZING THE MASSES 
The Taliban has exploited the fear of under-representation in the government to 
its advantage. It has spread the message among Pashtun tribes that any indifference on 
their part will result in the establishment of a non-Pashtun, secular Afghan 
government.119  It has portrayed Karzai’s appointment of outsiders to serve as district 
governors and the government’s failure to hold promised district-level elections as further 
evidence that the central government is inept and corrupt.120 
The Taliban has also galvanized a strong popular opposition to foreign 
intervention by highlighting the similarities between the 1979 Soviet invasion and the 
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2001 U.S.-led Coalition invasion. This message resonates with the population as people 
are still haunted by the memories of the Soviet occupation coupled with the common 
belief among almost all Afghans that the expulsion of the Soviets was the result of a 
legitimate and successful jihad.121 
Parallels between the Soviet and U.S. invasions can be easily drawn when viewed 
through the eyes of the Afghan population. Both invasions inserted into the country a 
large number of troops, in several instances using the same bases. Both the Soviets and 
the Americans quickly installed a new leader in Kabul who was supportive of their type 
of government. Both countries attempted to rebuild the National Army in its own image. 
Instead of recognizing and addressing the grievances of Afghan freedom fighters, both 
invading forces labeled them “terrorists.”  Both relied heavily on air power to fight 
guerrilla forces. Finally, and most obvious to most Afghans, both largely ignored or 
disregarded cultural taboos and paid no respect to the pride of the people.122 
Taliban information campaigns have had significant success in persuading the 
population to side with it against the Karzai government and Coalition forces. In contrast, 
Coalition information operations have not seen the same effects. This may be due in large 
part to the Taliban’s ability to maintain a persistent presence in villages where Coalition 
and government forces only make sporadic appearances. 
H. SHADOW GOVERNANCE 
While a military victory against Coalition forces is not a realistic goal for the 
Taliban, it has made some gains in demonstrating legitimacy and earning popular 
support. It has dedicated considerable effort toward maintaining a persistent presence 
across the country. In many areas it has been able to create the perception that it is the 
best available option in terms of governance and has demonstrated the ability to provide 
security and services to the people by maintaining a presence in villages despite Coalition 
and Afghan government patrols. It has established a Shadow Government system to serve 
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as a viable alternative to the legitimate Afghan government. At a national level, Mullah 
Omar has built the framework of a Taliban government structure which appears ready for 
the collapse of the Karzai administration.123  The reach of his organization is extensive, 
“in 33 out of 34 provinces, the Taliban has a Shadow Government,” said a senior official 
with NATO’s military intelligence in Kabul.124  The structure appears to be a well 
connected system maintained through a hierarchy of appointed governors at the 
provincial and district levels.   The integrity of the organization seems to have grown in 
significance due at least partially to successful efforts on the part of the Taliban to 
institutionalize its process of appointments.125 
The Taliban has several issues with which it can win public support. Among these 
is the of corruption of the Karzai government from the top-down, strong Afghan 
opposition to foreign occupation, the lack of economic opportunity, poor public safety 
and security, and weak governance by the central government.126  In order for a Shadow 
Government to be recognized as legitimate, it must be able to provide justice, security, 
and social services to the people.127  The Taliban has done just this by focusing its 
governance efforts from the village to the provincial levels. At the district and provincial 
levels it has appointed its own governors, police chiefs, and judges, who function in 
parallel, yet operate separately from Afghan government institutions. At the village level, 
local Taliban groups control the intelligence structure and direct orders to village cells 
acting in a semi-independent manner as recruiting hubs.128 
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One issue the Taliban faces in asserting its authority politically is that its 
influence disrupts the equilibrium found within the tribal system.129  Traditionally, there 
has been a delicate three-way balance of power between the tribal elder council (Khans), 
religious leader (Mullah), and government representative (Malik). When the Taliban 
“infects” a village, it destroys the symmetry of the tribal system and bring disorder to the 
community. 130  It then uses intimidation and fear tactics to mitigate resistance and assert 
control over the population and impose its own Shadow Government in place of the tribal 
system. 
The key to the Shadow Government establishing legitimacy is its ability to 
provide public services, especially rule of law. David Kilcullen writes that “dispute 
resolution is the public service that tribal and community leaders I have asked about this 
issue most ardently wish for.”131 The Taliban has shown significant ability over the 
government in this area. Despite the harshness of its strict interpretation of Sharia, 
Afghans still find it preferable to the slow and corrupt government run court systems.132  
The Taliban has exploited this weakness to its advantage by setting up a system of mobile 
courts which are seen as fast, fair, efficient, and effective by residents within Taliban 
areas of occupation. 
Through the use of these mobile courts, the Taliban has demonstrated its ability to 
deliver speedy and “impartial” justice where the government has failed to do so.133  An 
example of where the government’s shortcomings are creating an opportunity for Taliban 
expansion in the area of governance is in dispute resolution. Haji Sher Mohammad, of the 
Zhari district near Kandahar, has said “If I have a legal problem, the Taliban will rule in 
an hour according to our customs and Islam. If I take it to the government, in six months 
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nothing will have happened. Then whoever pays the most will win.”134  In certain cases, 
the Taliban has gone further in demonstrating impartiality by delivering verdicts against 
its own commanders in favor of civilians.135 
Beyond establishing courts to provide rule of law, the Taliban has followed 
through with its promise to provide security to local villages. Its own fighters serve as a 
police force which enforces laws, carrying out court sentences, and provides security for 
people and property. This is a significant gain for the Taliban Shadow Government as it 
adds to its aura of legitimacy. Gul Mohammad, a resident of Kandahar province, says that 
the Taliban has its own police force and that they “have everything they used to have 
when they were in government.”136  Since perception is reality, the Taliban seems to be 
earning a substantial place as the legitimate government in the eyes of the people. 
Another way that the Taliban Shadow Government has gained political credibility 
at the village level is by exploiting ethnic differences between the local tribes and the 
Karzai administration’s appointed governors. The Taliban has seized this opportunity by 
“posing as the defenders of the local tribes against misrule by unrepresentative appointed 
provincial and district governors, and seeking alliances with dispossessed and 
disenfranchised tribal brokers.”137  In some cases, the Taliban has executed the 
president’s appointed governors in order to create a void in which it can exert its 
authority. 
While the Taliban operates on a limited budget, it uses an efficient strategy to 
maximize its effects despite its limited means. In spite of a lack of funding, the Taliban is 
able to earn recognition for civic action. It has adopted the tactic of co-opting state 
sponsored schools, thereby controlling the teaching curriculum and earning legitimacy 
thanks to providing these public services.138 
                                                 
134 Ben Farmer, “Life under the Taliban,” The Telegraph, 21 June 2010, world news. 
135 Reilly, Shaping Strategic Communications, 180. 
136 Nijssen, Taliban’s Shadow Government in Afghanistan. 
137 Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla , 51. 
138 Giustozzi, Hearts, Minds, Barrel of Gun, 76. 
 54
In several instances, the Taliban has effectively used other forms of civic action to 
support the insurgency and stay relevant with the population. Its use of population and 
resource control measures is a cost effective and high impact way to show its ability to 
control the area while providing for the populace. By exercising control over both the 
population and limiting the availability of resources, it is able to demonstrate its 
legitimacy as the governing authority within areas it holds. These population and 
resource control techniques ensure that its own fighters receive support and recruits while 
denying support and recruits to the Karzai government and the U.S.-led Coalition. 
The Taliban’s control of the population through the use of intimidation has been 
crude but somewhat effective to date. While it is best to win the support of the population 
through addressing grievances, the Taliban has effectively achieved control, which is its 
desired end state. By demonstrating that it is able to maintain a monopoly, or at least 
exhibit the greater degree of control, over violence within villages it is able to establish a 
sense of legitimacy and authority. By systematically targeting any challengers to its 
power, it reinforces this perception of power. 
Provision of social services is one area where there is little data available. Antonio 
Giustozzi believes this is due to the fact that the Taliban operates on a limited budget and 
has developed a system of funneling what little money it has for social services through 
the madrassas.  “The Taliban do not provide aid directly except to madrasas [sic], but 
they hope by regulating Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) access to cast a 
development-friendly image.”139  In recent years, the Taliban has achieved success in the 
provision of public services through its opening of private schools and distributing 
supplies in areas under its control. Recently, this has expanded to include schools for girls 
in at least six provinces.140  A 2012 monograph from the RAND Corporation associates a 
rise in popular support for the Taliban with its ability to provide social services to the 
populace.141  Evidence suggests that the Pakistani Taliban has done the same thing over  
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the years, exploiting floods and earthquakes to co-opt and control the flow of NGO relief 
supplies and efforts to its advantage. It would seem that the Afghan Taliban is doing 
much the same. 
One technique of resource control that the Taliban uses is to tightly restrict the 
access of NGOs into areas it controls. By restricting access, it becomes the de facto 
approval authority for humanitarian and infrastructure improvement projects. This has 
multiple benefits for the Taliban. First, it signals to the populace that the Taliban is the 
authority figure outsiders have to deal with. This reinforces its legitimacy and proves it 
has power in the area. Second, when it allows in NGOs to conduct projects, it is seen to 
be providing jobs for its supporters. Third, this gives it a small source of income by 
charging taxes on the projects. Lastly, by rejecting access to any NGOs connected to the 
government or Coalition forces, it limits the government’s span of influence.142 
Another example of resource control is the Taliban’s dominance of the country’s 
number one export product, opium. According to United Nations reports, 90 percent of 
the world’s opium supply comes from Afghanistan and cultivation rose by 61 percent in 
2011.143  Under Taliban rule (up until 2001), poppy farming was outlawed in 
Afghanistan. But, in the face of weak governance, economic hardships, and general 
instability, output has since expanded greatly across the country. Viewing opium as a 
source of revenue and a means to exert control over a thriving economic industry, the 
Taliban has reversed its stance and turned the once forbidden trade into a full-blown 
business in order to generate funds to support itself. This has proven to be a lucrative 
venture and resulted in the expansion of its control. 
Research shows that the Taliban imposes as much as a full ten percent tax on 
poppy farmers’ profit.144   The entire trade is well organized and managed, which lends it 
the appearance of legitimacy and prevents corruption. Local Taliban commanders are 
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responsible for keeping track of how much farmers and other members of the local 
community earn.145  The village-level Taliban commander will even hand out written 
receipts for the amount of opium collected. This is in sharp contrast to the common 
perception among Afghans that the Karzai government is endemically corrupt.146  
Gretchen Peters writes that in multiple cases where farmers have complained to the 
Taliban leadership of being overcharged, commanders responded by punishing the 
subcommanders. This practice of running a large-scale illicit industry is reminiscent of 
American bootlegging of liquor in the late 1920s, except the money collected funds an 
insurgency instead of mafia criminal families. 
I. THE BATTLE FOR POPULAR OPINION 
Drugs aside, the Afghan Taliban has occupied the moral high ground as it wages a 
protracted campaign against the government. In recent years, it appears anxious to not 
overstep the limits of acceptable violence in the eyes of the populace. It has even gone so 
far as to publicly release its own rules of engagement to reinforce its legitimacy.147  In 
contrast, the Pakistani Taliban has failed to seize several opportunities to make itself 
seem more legitimate. An example of a missed opportunity to capture a stake in the 
political domain was the October 2012 anti-U.S. drone protests led by Imran Khan, a 
Pakistani cricketer-turned-politician.148  The planned 230-mile long peace march gained 
widespread international attention. There were an estimated 15,000 participants from the 
Waziristan area joined by 30 American citizens who flew in from the United States.149  
This was a prime opportunity for the Pakistani Taliban to use publicity to gain political 
support by co-opting the anti-American messaging and providing security for the 
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marchers. Instead of capitalizing on this event to increase its popular support and 
legitimacy, however, the Pakistan Taliban opposed the march and issued threats against 
the procession.150  Less than a week later, it further alienated moderate fence sitters when 
it attempted to assassinate Malala Yousafzai, a 14-year-old girl who had achieved 
notoriety for voicing her opposition to the Taliban on the Internet. This attack resulted in 
widespread protests in Pakistan.151 
Despite the Afghan Taliban’s missteps in exploiting political opportunities, it still 
has significant momentum and it is widely believed by the Afghan populace that it will 
win in the end.152  While serving as Commander of International Security Forces in 
Afghanistan, GEN Stanley McChrystal stated “[w]e face not only a resilient and growing 
insurgency; there is also a crisis of confidence among Afghans—in both their government 
and the international community—that undermines our credibility and emboldens the 
insurgents. Further, a perception that our resolve is uncertain makes Afghans reluctant to 
align with us against the insurgents.”153 
A January 2010 poll of Afghan civilians revealed that almost a third of the 
respondents believed that the Taliban had actually grown stronger throughout 2009.154  In 
addition to the growing public perception of Taliban strength, the Taliban knows that 
with the pending withdrawal of significant NATO forces from Afghanistan, its best 
option for the future is to continue to maintain and increase its popular support. This can 
be accomplished at a small cost by demonstrating resistance against the invader as well as 
offering support to needy Afghans.   
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“Overall, U.S. information efforts did not succeed in convincing most residents of 
contested areas to side decisively with the Afghan government and its allies against the 
Taliban. Even when PSYOP messages were delivered well, their credibility was undercut 
by concern that the Afghan government would not be able to protect civilians from the 
Taliban after a U.S. and NATO force withdrawal.”155 
J. BUILDING NETWORKS 
The Taliban continues to gain significant influence and develop complex 
networks of influence at the village level. It accomplishes this by getting the support of 
key village-level leaders and weaving itself into the social fabric of the village. The tactic 
which the Taliban uses most successfully is a staged infiltration method. In the first 
phase, a Taliban religious representative (Mullah) enters the village and attempts to win 
village support via a religious appeal. If this is successful, a small cadre of Taliban 
fighters will enter the village to strengthen popular support and begin establishing a base 
of operations. If the Mullah is not able to gain the support of the village, the Taliban 
fighters will employ coercive measures and intimidation tactics, such as night letters and 
making examples of people who do not cooperate, in order to force the village to support 
the insurgency.156  By emplacing its own members, the Taliban is able to assess the state 
of affairs in a target village and enter the social system through the least invasive means 
possible. Once it has established a place within the village’s social structure, it exploits 
existing tribal and familial ties in order to expand its influence and build alliances.157  
This system of network development gives the Taliban a distinct advantage over 
Coalition forces because it is able to leverage its ethnic and regional ties to the locals in a 
way that is not possible for any foreigners. 
The development of village networks has the added value of supporting the 
Taliban’s guerrilla activities. The Taliban’s supply and logistics capabilities are limited 
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because Taliban fighters tend to travel lightly and rely more on foot trails than road 
networks. They have overcome this limitation by establishing bases of support within 
Afghan villages. By using these bases as hubs of operation, the guerrillas are able to 
employ “flying columns” that move relatively quickly by foot from Pakistan into 
Afghanistan without the added burden of logistics trains to support them.158  These 
village networks also provide the intelligence and close reconnaissance necessary for 
targeting to minimize collateral damage and disruption for the civilian populace. The 
Taliban relies heavily on the use of part-time guerrillas from the villages to serve as 
guides and supplemental manpower.159  The Taliban is able to consolidate troops and 
supplies at key locations in order to quickly amass forces when it does decide to launch 
attacks. 
K. CONCLUSION 
While the Taliban is limited by monetary constraints and an apparent lack of 
understanding of how to fully leverage its political opportunities, it has wisely used civic 
action to support its insurgency in many respects. It has made significant gains in its 
ability to exploit existing networks to its advantage. This, coupled with ethnic divides 
between villages and the government, has given the Taliban an edge in the war of public 
opinion. The Taliban’s use of Shadow Governments to provide the aura of legitimacy 
through the implementation of security, justice, and rule of law has earned it significant 
credibility as an alternative to the Karzai administration. By reinforcing this view through 
the implementation of population and resource control measures and the provision of 
social services, the Taliban stands a good chance of holding a significant percentage of 
popular support until the 2014 withdrawal of foreign forces. 
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VI. UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE CIVIL AFFAIRS 
OPERATIONS 
The preceding four chapters provide examples of tactics, techniques and 
procedures (TTPs) that support revolutionary warfare and contribute to strategic success. 
These TTPs help resistance movements gain traction within existing populations and thus 
build cooperative coalitions. To varying degrees, resistance leaders were able to entice 
individuals and pre-existing networks to form coalitions. The case studies presented here 
are not isolated. Studies have shown that numerous successful insurgencies gained lasting 
public support in the face of opposition using coalitions to support Guerrilla Warfare, 
Shadow Government and Mass Mobilization efforts. Over time, insurgent organizations 
such as the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and the Maoist rebels in Nepal have been 
able to: build cohesive coalitions through neutral or seemingly-neutral civic groups, 
motivate radical groups to protect the core of a resistance coalition, build effective and 
influential leadership, and generate internal resources.160   By building up the overall 
effectiveness of the coalition and deepening and broadening public support for it, 
insurgents have been able to bring political and military power to bear on the opponent.   
Each of the discussed cases also provide examples of tactical lessons to be 
learned, and ways for Civil Affairs and other U.S. government representatives to use 
civic action to strengthen leaders, build popular support, and sustain a guerrilla force. 
More importantly, there are operational and strategic lessons that can be applied to 
planning and executing a UW campaign. These lessons demonstrate simple (but not easy) 
ways to understand the UW operational environment. They suggest ways to implement 
civic action programs that will effectively strengthen all three LOEs in a manner that 
ultimately leads to a resilient coalition.   
In each case, we can tie tactical civic action to strategic operations that led 
directly to the development of a coalition. Most successful resistance or insurgency 
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movements gather their strength from robust Shadow Government and Mass Base 
organizations. These organizations are what enable and sustain the Guerrilla Warfare 
component through to transition. Taking the lessons learned from our case studies, shown 
in Table 1, we can now recommend ways to use Civil Affairs capabilities to enhance the 
Shadow Government and Mass Base aspects of resistance movements.   In this way, a 
UW campaign will make better use of CA’s ability to take advantage of grievances, and 
exploit and reinforce social structures, transfer those structures to the new government 
after Transition, and enable the new government to use those structures to build 
legitimacy and political strength. 
 




+Connected armed forces 
leaders with populaceL 
 










+Built leaders from those 
with existing cloutL 
 
+Mentored and maintained 
SG leader’s moraleL 









+Used land reform to 
improve well-beingL,IR 
 
+United civic orgs and 
politicians  to support 
leader and facilitate 
electionsN, L, IR,  
 
+Instituted education 
campaigns to spread 
supportive ideologyL, IR 
+Connected armed 
forces with local 
populaceL 
 
+Bolstered armed forces’ 
reputations with civic 
actions and messagingL,IR 
 
+Coordinated civic action 
with security effortsR 
 
+Used land reform to 
deny opponent recruitsIR 





that could carry over post-
TransitionL,IR 
 
+Worked through tribal 
leaders to influence peopleN 




+Used relief operations 




+Provided alternative to 
opponent’s schoolsIR,N 
 
+Used local personal 








+Used relief supplies to 
immediately  relieve 
guerrillasL,IR 
 
+Used medical and 
agricultural 
improvements to improve 


















schools, mosques, public 
services to provide help and 
as messaging platformsN,IR 
 
+Established ministries; 
interior, finance, justice, 
information, foreign affairsL,IR 
 
+Opened administrative 




+Tied Mass Mobilization 
to the strategic planIR 
 
+Coopted existing 
networks into the 
movementN,IR 
 
+Worked through tribal 
and religious leaders for 














discrimination to build 
recruitmentIR 
 
+Gained external support 
for funding and suppliesL 
-Failed to gain 







-Failed to end 
“amoral” looting 
after U.S. invasion 
Afghan 
Taliban 
+Provide uncorrupt alternate 
governanceL 
 
+Establish quick, impartial 
mobile courtsL 
 
+Provide security at village 
levelL,IR 
 
+Provision of private 
schools, co-opt state 
schools N,L,IR 
 
+Control opium industry and 
aid resourcesR,IR  
 
+Control population through 
intimidationR,IR 
+Exploit ethnic, tribal, 
familial tiesN,IR 
 





operations to delegitimize 
current administrationL 
 
+Use persistent presence 
to develop social 
networks and alliancesL,IR 
 
+Use village networks for 
intelligence and logistical 
support to guerrillasN,L,IR0   
 
 
+Fail to exploit 
opportunities to 








Table 1.   TTPs used successfully in each of the four cases. Superscript N,R, L, and IR 
indicates whether each supported N) using neutral organizations, R) using 
radical groups to protect the core, L) building leaders and organizations that 
could survive without them, or IR) internal resource generation. 
A. CLARIFYING DOCTRINE 
The focus of current Civil Affairs UW doctrine is on the technical application of 
the five core tasks of support to civil administration (SCA), populace and resources 
control (PRC), foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA), nation assistance (NA), and civil 
information management (CIM). This is adequate as a general guide. These are the tasks 
that a CA unit can be expected to perform in a generalized combat or peace-
keeping/peace-enforcement operation. However, the doctrine that describes and defines 
these tasks falls short by not recognizing the importance of a nuanced and trust-based 
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strategic plan to identify, develop, and motivate the people and organizations which can 
best build capable and willing civil, political, and logistical infrastructure in a semi- or 
non-permissive UW environment. It also fails to either address functional implementation 
of such a plan or emphasize diverse solutions to complex problems.  
Civil Affairs Operations are defined in Joint Publication 3–57 Civil-Military 
Operations as: 
Civil Affairs Operations (CAO)—Those military operations conducted 
by civil affairs forces that (1) enhance the relationship between military 
forces and civil authorities in localities where military forces are present; 
(2) require coordination with other interagency organizations, 
intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, 
indigenous populations and institutions, and the private sector; and (3) 
involve application of functional specialty skills that normally are the 
responsibility of civil government to enhance the conduct of civil-military 
operations. 
The focus here is on the range of possible activities that can be taken to mitigate civil-
military friction, address grievances, and build capacities. This definition is useful, and it 
does guide planners and operators to accomplish the tasks that can help to overcome 
some of the key difficulties of mobilization, like providing civil-military assistance to 
help groups of individuals who share similar grievances or ideologies. However, it does 
not describe how to turn these individuals and groups into organizations that can act as a 
coalition which works toward the overall mission of the campaign. This doctrine also 
leaves the “why” out of the tasks and largely overlooks the development of SG, MM and 
GW as CA capabilities available to a UW Task Force. Failure to address how to turn 
individuals into a coalition using CAO will sell CAO short when it comes time to plan 
and execute a UW campaign. 
Clarifying the differences between typical CAO and Unconventional Warfare 
CAO will provide planners and operators alike a more precise understanding of the 
complexity of conducting CAO in a UW environment. It will also broaden the UW Task 
Force’s range of possibilities for using CA-like activities to strengthen the campaign. 
There should be some clear delineation between typical CAO that consists of the five 
core tasks and that which exceeds these parameters. Such tasks call upon more specific 
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capabilities to develop and motivate a Shadow Government, coordinate and strengthen 
Mass Mobilization efforts, as well as tactically and operationally support the Guerrilla 
Warfare efforts. CAO that exclusively support a UW campaign might be better defined as 
follows: 
Unconventional Warfare Civil Affairs Operations (UCAO)—Those 
Civil Affairs Operations conducted by Civil Affairs Forces that (1) 
identify, exploit, and reinforce common grievances and social structures 
that can contribute to the organization of the Guerrillas, the Mass Base and 
the Shadow Government; (2)  operationalize plans to transfer those 
structures  to the new government after Transition; and (3) enable the new 
government to use those structures to alleviate grievances in order to build 
legitimacy and political strength.   
The focus here is on the targeted application of civic activities to build political 
and social power that can strengthen a resistance, undermine the existing government, 
and be transferred to the legitimate government after transition. This definition provides a 
concise description of the lines of effort that a UCAO plan should strengthen and a long-
term, strategic vision of the plan from “left of beginning” through Transition. There is 
one additional shortcoming in existing doctrine that this definition exposes; CA Doctrine 
should be enhanced by refining and bolstering CA persistent engagement programs to 
significantly enhance a UW campaign. Focusing the efforts of CMSEs and similar 
mission teams toward setting the stage for UW in strategically important locations will 
accomplish this. This includes refining Named Areas of Interest (NAI) and Targeted 
Areas of Interest (TAI), identifying and understanding important populations, 
establishing contacts with contractors and business organizations that can be used to 
activate a resistance, and other activities. Such activities can be done with little deviation 
from normal CMSE activities. In countries where there is no CMSE or persistent SOF 
engagement program at all, programs in adjacent countries and regions may be able to 
achieve some of this “left-of-beginning” work for a UCAO campaign. In regions where 
there is no CMSE or persistent engagement presence, data-mining, reaching out to 




necessary, if not sufficient. It will be necessary to devise alternative methods for 
battlefield preparation in advance of a UCAO campaign in these instances, but that is 
beyond the scope of this thesis. 
B. EXPANDING OUR UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT UNCONVENTIONAL 
CIVIL AFFAIRS IS 
Drawing from the cases discussed, we can see that CA can do very specific things 
to influence each of the LOEs in a UW campaign. Specific applications of CAO can be 
used for  
1. Cohesive coalition building through neutral civic groups,  
2. Mobilizing radical groups to protect the core of a resistance coalition, 
3. Leadership building 
4. Internal resource generation.    
When taken individually, one can see how existing CA doctrine, bolstered by the 
expanded definition and scope of UCAO, can and does support each of these subtasks 
within the greater realm of UW. Together, these form what we will refer to here as Civil 
Network Development: taking individuals and organizations, applying UCAO where it 
fits, and building a coalition of popular support that can feed the overall campaign.   
1. Building Complexity through Neutral Subgroups 
The cases we have discussed illustrate how adept organizers have used tactical 
civic action to strengthen broad resistance campaigns. They relied on existing social, 
tribal, and political networks to build resistance infrastructures. Building on these cases 
and taking some lessons from the experiences of resistance movements that became 
revolutions we can make recommendations for the types of organizations that a CA 
practitioner might align with and employ in a UW campaign.   
Social Movement theorists have shown that “complexity” in a resistance network 
can overcome some of the difficulties of organizing a revolution, especially under a 
totalitarian or authoritarian regime.   A network can be considered complex if it has a 
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large population (domain), many and diverse subgroups in the network structure 
(cliques), overlapping individual memberships, and numerous intermediaries (brokers) 
who can bridge the socio-political gaps between cliques.161   A resistance network built 
with this kind of complexity will be better equipped to support itself, to build coalitions 
among a diversity of subgroups, to reduce friction between hostile subgroups, and to 
divert and resist state repression. It can also, through neutral organizations, provide the 
fertile ground necessary to build and grow radical organizations, leaders and internal 
resource generation capabilities.  
Grievance groups, militant movements, refugee populations and labor groups are 
likely under heavy surveillance by the repressive regime. Using benign organizations as 
brokers and as a means to connect and motivate disparate groups into a usable coalition is 
a way to overcome this obstacle. Borrowing lessons from years of research in the field of 
Social Movement Theory, some fundamental requirements emerge for building a strong 
coalition of heterogeneous groups to strengthen a resistance. Inclusion of civic 
organizations can bridge gaps between groups that may be ideologically opposed or 
might not otherwise knowingly cooperate. These may include religious groups, business 
bureaus or chambers, or broadly inclusive human rights or education lobby groups. 
Groups like these can combine existing but separate and even disenfranchised 
organizations into a more complex and broadly appealing coalition.  
Civil Affairs operators can conduct CAO in ways that makes use of this concept 
in numerous ways. They can strengthen existing neutral groups with funding and 
resources in advance of Phase III to increase their capacity to act as connectors and 
organizers themselves. They can organize community meetings and assist in the planning 
and execution of organization- and coalition-sized civic actions that those in the meetings 
determine will be useful. They can apply CAO to generate rally points where groups with 
differing grievances and ideologies but common vulnerabilities can meet and interact, 
steering these groups toward cooperation and a broader common goal than each would  
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achieve on its own. They can then act as ideological and operational mentors, focusing 
the disparate groups’ dissatisfaction toward the “far target” rather than each of their “near 
targets.”    
2. Mobilizing and Enabling Radical Groups to Protect the Core  
Given a broad coalition of diverse networks, radical groups may be used as a 
diversion, to deflect state repression away from the key players in the coalition and buy 
time for the movement to build popular support that can be translated into political and 
military influence.   With such a framework, it will be far easier to expand leadership 
building and internal resource generation efforts to further strengthen the coalition. It 
may be necessary to establish a central committee or several coordinating committees to 
provide guidance and motivation to the numerous organizations.   Such committees might 
or might not be staffed by members of the intended transition government. In either case, 
they can serve as injection points, providing solutions to disenfranchised populations and 
alleviating grievances after Transition to assist in demobilization. Presumably, each 
committee and subcommittee would be well-versed in the Leader’s myths and methods to 
be able to carry on if he is removed from active participation.   
 
Figure 2.  A model for effective Civil Network Development. Efforts must gather 
individuals into existing organizations; organizations into a coalition; and the 
coalition into a supporting arm of the Campaign. 
Again, there are specific things that CA operators can do to strengthen and 
operationalize this concept during the campaign. For instance, they can provide 
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humanitarian assistance and disaster response by, with, and through the radical group to 
the affected populations that make up its recruiting pool. CA operators can mentor and 
guide radical leaders in the methods of violent and non-violent protest and other public 
actions. Examples of non-violent action might include symbols and statements, 
assemblies, marches, processions, boycotts, economic noncooperation, strikes, slow-
downs, civil disobedience, and blockades.162  CA can provide tactical CAO to GW and 
radical group encampments and population centers in order to alleviate the difficulties of 
daily life and to free military-age males and others to do the work of the resistance. 
Additionally, CA operators could mentor radical groups and paramilitary organizations in 
self-restraint and careful consideration of timing in operations; encouraging them to act 
when action is appropriate and will support the campaign and to not act when it will not.   
3. Building Leaders, and Organizations that Survive Without Them 
It is easy to get caught in the trap of “doing Civil Affairs” where the need seems 
greatest. CA soldiers must be aware of the simple value of CAO and the complex echoes 
that each operation can produce. Civic action is a simple means to accomplish complex, 
people-centered tasks. The fact that civic action attracts personal appreciation is 
important. People are thankful and may reciprocate when given assistance. The fact that 
civic action is itself an end is important to understand, too. The mere act of executing a 
civic action program connects the resistance to the population; exposing one to the other 
in a positive and legitimizing manner. In order to capitalize on tactical-level civic action 
and make the secondary and tertiary effects positively impact the resistance, each 
organization and the broad coalition must have effective leadership. Michael Freeman 
argues, based on numerous case studies, that an organization’s leader inspires members 
and/or manages the organization by providing operational direction. He further argues 
that if leaders are the sole providers of these functions and subordinates are not developed 
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who can carry on those roles, then simple and effective leadership targeting will weaken 
or destroy the organization.163   In an American-supported UW campaign, the Guerrilla 
Force leaders will likely be trained and mentored by U.S. Special Forces. The task of 
identifying candidates to receive Civil Network Development training and mentoring, as 
well as the task of training effective top- and mid-level Mass Base and Shadow 
Government leaders should fall on the Civil Affairs soldiers involved in the campaign. 
They have the training, connections, and the physical and professional proximity 
necessary to do so.   
In order to bolster organizations and their leaders, CAO must be targeted to help 
the leaders strengthen their particular roles, whether it be “[inspiring] members of the 
organization and/or [managing] that organization by providing operational direction.”164  
CA soldiers should assist in building and strengthening the legend of charismatic leaders 
through tactical CAO that reinforces their status as the provider, protector, and guide to a 
better future. CA soldiers should reinforce the “routinization” of a charismatic leader’s 
ability to inspire so that it outlasts him. This includes spreading tactical CAO in the 
leader’s name using his symbols, myths, rites, rituals and ceremonies, and empowering 
and inspiring loosely-connected individuals and organizations to do the same.   Similarly, 
CA operators should train and mentor subordinate organization leaders who can carry on 
the central leader’s message. The goal here should be to “institutionalize” the message 
and the actions of the inspirational and operational leader who began and/or grew the 
organization. In this way, the group will be less vulnerable to leadership targeting and 
will stand stronger in the face of suppression. As mentors to Mass Base and Shadow 
Government leaders, CA operators should provide alternatives to ill-conceived violent 
actions. This is most important when some member of the coalition is planning to 
kinetically target some population or infrastructure that might be better engaged through 
non-violent means or civic action. Persuading a petroleum-workers union to strike rather  
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than destroy an oil pipeline is one possible example. This type of alternative action can 
achieve the desired result, preserve the infrastructure, and maintain public support for use 
post Transition.   
4. Generating Resources Internally 
The organizations that make up the coalition, and the coalition itself, must be 
capable of generating and mobilizing resources internally. External support will likely be 
a key part of the campaign, but for legitimacy and strength the resistance should be able 
to provide for itself to some extent.   Resource mobilization efforts “aim to preserve and 
expand organizational resources, such as money, meeting places and other facilities, 
labor, and communications technology, and to exploit or develop social networks and 
other types of mobilizing structures that can help to further the growth and objectives of 
the group in organizing, directing, and mobilizing contention.”165   These are efforts that 
can be facilitated from the outside, but are better done from within the organizations and 
coalition by legitimate members. Again, Civil Affairs personnel are inherently well-
placed to bridge the gap between those who can provide this type of support, those who 
can protect them, and those who can make use of them. This is one aspect of a campaign 
where Civil Information Management can significantly enhance UCAO efforts. 
Gathering and analyzing information about local taxation norms, logistical resources, 
transportation routes and infrastructure, storage facilities, meeting places, and so on will 
provide the resistance with the tools it needs to make better use of its internal resources. 
The more effectively a resistance uses its internal resources, the fewer external resources 
will be needed. This adds legitimacy and moral strength to the resistance while allowing 
the supporting external element to maintain its clandestine or low-profile character.   
CA operators should focus internal resource generation efforts to build and grow 
organizational resources from within and link the coalition to local and regional sources 
that build legitimacy and internal strength, to include funding, physical infrastructure, 
witting and unwitting workers, and communication networks. The coalition should also 
use existing social networks and mobilizing structures to identify, recruit, organize, and 
                                                 
165 Davis, et al. Public Support for Insurgency and Terrorism. 20. 
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mobilize a Mass Base in support of the overall campaign. Civil Affairs soldiers can 
analyze existing resources, identify shortages and gaps, and work to supplement local 
efforts with external funding and resources where necessary. They can work through 
existing education, civic, relief, religious, and social organizations to make use of 
existing infrastructure for meeting places, communications centers, and planning 
facilities. They can then tie local organizations to provincial and regional organizations 
for sharing of resources and methods of resource generation. 
C. UPDATING OUR DOCTRINE 
The following by-phase description of UCAO overlays existing UW-specific 
CAO doctrine166 with what we have discerned through our research. It also adds a “Phase 
0” that includes the possibility of some persistent engagement presence, but does not 
depend on it. This Phase 0 is just as important where there is no persistent engagement 
program, but as previously stated the methods involved might vary based on the access 
that CA operators have to relevant populations and information.  (Italics indicates a new 
addition) 
 Phase 0: (Responsibility: Regionally-aligned BN CAPT and BN CLT, CMSE, TSOC 
J9, Theater CMSE) 
o Providing broad civil considerations analysis of the host nation and regional 
neighbors identified as security concerns to identify potential civil 
vulnerabilities, grievances, and weaknesses within civil society that may be 
leveraged by an interested party to generate mobilization of the population. 
o Identifying internal and external actors that impact the civil environment in 
potential target areas, neighboring friendly nations, and around the world 
through diaspora and refugee populations. 
                                                 
166 The existing doctrine here can be found, with some variation, in Training Circular 18–01 (2011), 
Special Forces Unconventional Warfare, FM 3–05.130, Army Special Operations Forces Unconventional 
Warfare (2008), FM 3–05.40, Civil Affairs Operations (2006), and Army Techniques Publication 3–05.1, 
Unconventional Warfare (Final Draft, August, 2012).  
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o Identifying potential government-in-exile or Shadow Government 
representatives. 
o Identifying and contacting possible connector organizations that can serve as 
neutral collaboration and recruiting points for elements of the guerrilla, 
Shadow Government, and Mass Base organizations. 
o Identifying commercial, humanitarian, and third-country logistical networks 
that could be exploited to provide materiel or transportation support to a 
potential UW campaign.   
 Phase I: (Primary responsibility: UWTF CA Element) 
o Providing detailed civil considerations analysis of the Joint Special Operations 
Area to identify potential civil vulnerabilities, grievances, and weaknesses 
within civil society that may be leveraged by the insurgency to generate 
mobilization of the population. 
o Identifying foreign humanitarian assistance funding sources. 
o Identifying specific narratives used by potential resistance members that can 
be strengthened with CAO. 
o Identifying existing social movement organizations and possible means to 
motivate them to action. 
o Initiating CA support coordination with any government-in-exile or Shadow 
Government representatives if established. 
o Initiating transition planning by developing a disengagement concept and 
identifying the CMO end state. 
o Coordinating with internal and external parties (diaspora, refugees, exiles) to 
initiate planning and implementation of quick, high-impact projects to 




 Phase II: (Primary responsibility: UWTF CA Element) 
o Integrating with the pilot team-planning cell. 
o Identifying sources of foreign humanitarian assistance, to include 
intergovernmental organizations and nongovernmental organizations. 
o Preparing to insert with the pilot team, if required, to support initial 
assessments. 
o Training and mentoring leaders and elements of the Shadow Government and 
Mass Base organizations that can be accessed prior to infiltration. 
o Preparing to provide detailed CAO or CMO analysis of pilot team 
assessments. 
o Identifying quick, high-impact projects based on pilot team assessments. 
 
 Phase III: (Primary responsibility; UWTF CA Element) 
o Validating CA inputs to the intelligence preparation of the environment. 
o Identifying and liaising with key leaders within the indigenous population 
who may influence the CAO/CMO plan. 
o Establishing proxy or surrogate CAO implementing partners within existing 
organizations, Shadow Government, and Mass Mobilization networks of 
influence. 
o Preparing to insert with the SF detachments if required. 
o Conducting key leader engagement. 
o Establishing coordinating committees to act as a link between indigenous 




 Phase IV: (Primary responsibility: UWTF CA Element) 
o Refining CA input to intelligence preparation of the environment. 
o Facilitating the buildup of the resistance force with targeted CAO and 
mentorship. 
o Initiating CAO (foreign humanitarian assistance, nation assistance, and 
populace and resources control). 
o Advising proxy or surrogate CAO implementing partners to implement CAO 
that assists in strengthening resistance, winning support, and denying 
population and resources to the government. 
o Strengthening resistance narratives with targeted HA/DR and PRC efforts. 
o Facilitating the employment of social movement organizations to create 
limited disruption, undermining government legitimacy. 
 
 Phase V: (Primary responsibility: UWTF CA Element) 
o Validating measures of effectiveness. 
o Monitoring or assessing effects. 
o Executing CAO. 
o Mentoring social movement organizations, Shadow Government, and Mass 
Mobilization elements to sustain morale and ensure ongoing effectiveness. 
o Advising resistance elements to use restraint in targeting, emphasizing the use 
of non-kinetic means of target neutralization in order to preserve 





 Phase VI: (Primary responsibility: UWTF CA Element) 
o Mitigating impact of combat operations on the indigenous civilian population. 
o Surging foreign humanitarian assistance. 
o Preparing to execute planned populace and resources control (dislocated 
civilian operations). 
o Encouraging dislocated civilian populations to support resistance, add 
strength to civil disturbances, or at least remain neutral.   
o Deconflicting intergovernmental and nongovernmental organization 
operations supporting unity of effort. 
 
 Phase VII: (Responsibility: UWTF CA Element, Follow-On CAO/CMO-capable 
forces and Interagency) 
o Executing support to civil administration operations to advise and assist the 
new or provisional government. 
o Focusing CAO to address key grievances of civil population and strengthen 
the reputation of the new or provisional government. 
o Assisting with resistance demobilization through economic, humanitarian, 
educational, medical, and other relief operations. 
o Supporting post-hostility institutions to foster legitimacy and transparency of 
government. 






For simplicity’s sake, the following table may be useful in describing the general 
types of UCAO activities that can make the difference in each phase. The tactical details 
are left out of this table, but the general concept of how UCAO can strengthen the 
campaign remains. Again, this builds on existing doctrine and adds to it based on what 
our research has shown to be useful.   
 
Table 2.   A by phase, generalized description of UCAO. 167 
D. CONCLUSION 
As the history of revolution and counter-revolution indicates, Shadow 
Governments and a Mass Base of support are supremely important to the longevity and 
success of a resistance. These components allow the Guerrilla Warfare effort to grow and 
succeed. The responsibility for synthesizing what can be learned from studying civic 
                                                 
167 Original table taken from Army Techniques Publication 3–05.1, Unconventional Warfare (Final 
Draft, August, 2012) 
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action successes like those of Ed Lansdale, Edgar Buell, Muqtada al-Sadr, and even of 
the Afghan Taliban should fall on the Special Operations element that is oriented toward 
understanding and interacting with the civil element of a campaign and is “organized, 
trained and equipped to accomplish the core tasks” of ARSOF. The U.S. Army Civil 
Affairs branch, specifically the 95th Civil Affairs Brigade, is the natural and appropriate 
place for the synthesis that needs to occur. Current Civil Affairs capabilities should be 
maintained and enhanced to conduct the operations and provide the effects listed above. 
Using CA capabilities to build resistance coalitions, enhance leadership capabilities and 
organizational strength, and build internal resource generation capabilities will enhance 
the efficiency and operational autonomy of UW campaigns.    
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APPENDIX 
Below are the results of the survey the authors conducted from September to 
November, 2012. The results are cross tabulated with MOS for ease of analysis. 
1. What is your current position? 
  
What is your 
MOS?   











Staff 10 0 
2
5 33.7% 35 
Operational 2 0 
5
2 51.9% 54 
answered question 104 
skipped question 0 
       
       
2. What is your rank? 
  
What is your 
MOS?   






E1 0 0 0 0.0% 0 
E2 0 0 0 0.0% 0 
E3 0 0 0 0.0% 0 
E4 0 0 0 0.0% 0 
E5 0 0 0 0.0% 0 
E6 0 0 8 7.8% 8 
E7 1 1 18 19.4% 20 
E8 1 0 11 11.7% 12 
E9 2 0 1 2.9% 3 
WO1 0 0 0 0.0% 0 
CW2 2 0 0 1.9% 2 
CW3 0 0 0 0.0% 0 
CW4 0 0 0 0.0% 0 
CW5 0 0 0 0.0% 0 
O1 0 0 0 0.0% 0 
O2 0 0 0 0.0% 0 
O3 3 0 35 36.9% 38 
O4 5 1 10 15.5% 16 
O5 0 0 4 3.9% 4 
O6 0 0 0 0.0% 0 
 80
O7 0 0 0 0.0% 0 
O8 0 0 0 0.0% 0 
O9 0 0 0 0.0% 0 
answered question 103 
skipped question 1 
       
       
3. What is your highest education level? 
  
What is your 
MOS?   






High School 0 0 0 0.0% 0 
Some College 3 0 21 23.3% 24 
Associates 1 0 8 8.7% 9 
Bachelors 5 0 32 35.9% 37 
Masters 6 1 25 31.1% 32 
Post-Graduate 0 1 0 1.0% 1 
answered question 103 
skipped question 1 
       
       
4. How long have you been in the military? 
  
What is your 
MOS?   





0–2 years 0 0 0 0.0% 0 
2–5 years 0 0 1 1.0% 1 
5–10 years 2 1 31 32.7% 34 
10–15 years 6 0 25 29.8% 31 
15–20 years 3 1 22 25.0% 26 
> 20 years 4 0 8 11.5% 12 
answered question 104 
skipped question 0 
       
       
5. Have you deployed? If so, where? 
  
What is your 
MOS?   





Where 14 2 86 100.0% 102 
answered question 102 
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       6. If you have deployed, what was the type 
of deployment? 
  
What is your 
MOS?   






Combat 15 2 82 97.1% 99 
JCET 12 0 11 22.5% 23 
CMSE 0 0 37 36.3% 37 
MIST 0 2 1 2.9% 3 
Other (please specify) 15 
answered question 102 
skipped question 2 
       
       7. Have you ever received training 
(classes, briefings, etc.) on the role of 
Civic Action in support of Unconventional 
Warfare? 
  
What is your 
MOS?   






Yes 12 0 71 79.8% 83 
No 3 2 16 20.2% 21 
answered question 104 
skipped question 0 
       
       
8. If so, how recently? 
  
What is your 
MOS?   





Within last 60 days. 6 0 16 26.8% 22 
Within last year. 1 0 31 39.0% 32 
Within last 10 years. 4 0 23 32.9% 27 
More than 10 years ago. 1 0 0 1.2% 1 
answered question 82 
skipped question 22 
 
 







       9. How many Unconventional Warfare 
focused training exercises have you 
participated in? Where and when? (Robin 
Sage, JRTC, SFWOC, Other, Etc) 
  
What is your 
MOS?   





Number of Exercises 14 2 65 98.8% 81 
Where 15 2 51 82.9% 68 
When 13 2 47 75.6% 62 
answered question 82 
skipped question 22 
       
       10. How much do you agree with the 
following statement: Civil Affairs personnel 
are prepared to operate through the use of 
proxies, either in a denied area, a neutral 
territory, or a third country, in support of a 
UW campaign. 
  
What is your 
MOS?   




1. Completely Disagree 1 0 6 6.7% 7 
2. Disagree 3 1 7 10.6% 11 
3. Somewhat Disagree 4 1 6 10.6% 11 
4. Neutral 1 0 7 7.7% 8 
5. Somewhat Agree 3 0 26 27.9% 29 
6. Agree 3 0 18 20.2% 21 
7. Completely Agree 0 0 17 16.3% 17 
Why? (Optional) 61 
answered question 104 
















       11. How much do you agree with the 
following statement: Civil Affairs personnel 
are prepared to assess and recruit civil 
leaders and facilitators to build and 
activate resistance networks in 
preparation for a UW campaign. 
  
What is your 
MOS?   




1. Completely Disagree 2 1 3 5.9% 6 
2. Disagree 4 1 8 12.7% 13 
3. Somewhat Disagree 4 0 7 10.8% 11 
4. Neutral 3 0 8 10.8% 11 
5. Somewhat Agree 1 0 21 21.6% 22 
6. Agree 0 0 23 22.5% 23 
7. Completely Agree 1 0 15 15.7% 16 
Why? (Optional) 56 
answered question 102 
skipped question 2 
       
       12. Select the three most important 
character traits based on their importance 
in the selection of Civil Affairs personnel 
as candidates for operational roles in the 
UW mission. 
  
What is your 
MOS?   




Trustworthiness 5 0 17 21.2% 22 
Creativity 3 0 40 41.3% 43 
Honesty 3 0 6 8.7% 9 
Flexibility 3 0 37 38.5% 40 
Independence 2 0 25 26.0% 27 
Interpersonal Skills 8 2 63 70.2% 73 
Leadership 2 0 23 24.0% 25 
Maturity 10 2 42 51.9% 54 
Patriotism 1 0 3 3.8% 4 
Physical Fitness 2 0 12 13.5% 14 
Organizational Skills 3 0 10 12.5% 13 
Persuasiveness 3 2 18 22.1% 23 
answered question 104 
skipped question 0 
 
 




       13. Should special selection criteria apply 
when selecting Civil Affairs personnel to 
conduct UW operations? 
  
What is your 
MOS?   




No. It cannot be assessed 1 0 0 1.0% 1 
No. Any soldier should be able to play 
their part in UW 0 0 3 2.9% 3 
No. Selection into SOF should suffice 0 0 13 12.6% 13 
Yes. It should be a physical assessment 0 0 1 1.0% 1 
Yes. It should be a mental assessment 1 0 13 13.6% 14 
Yes. It should be mental and physical 13 2 47 60.2% 62 
Yes. It can be determined through a file 
review 0 0 5 4.9% 5 
Do Not Know 0 0 4 3.9% 4 
answered question 103 
skipped question 1 
       
       14. Compared to the following, how 




What is your 
MOS?   
 
Answer Options 18 37 38 
Respons
e Count 
 Guerrilla Force Military Development 
 Unimportant 2 2 3   
 Less Important 8 0 19   
 As Important 5 0 46   
 More Important 0 0 15   
 Do Not Know 0 0 3   
   15 2 86 103 
 Auxiliary Military/Paramilitary 
Development 
 Unimportant 1 2 2   
 Less Important 6 0 14   
 As Important 5 0 52   
 More Important 3 0 15   
 Do Not Know 0 0 3   
   15 2 86 103 
 Auxiliary Political Development 
 Unimportant 0 0 0   
 Less Important 4 2 6   
 As Important 5 0 40   
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More Important 6 0 37   
 Do Not Know 0 0 3   
   15 2 86 103 
 Underground Technical Development 
 Unimportant 0 1 2   
 Less Important 8 0 20   
 As Important 7 1 32   
 More Important 0 0 27   
 Do Not Know 0 0 5   
   15 2 86 103 
 Underground Political Development 
 Unimportant 0 0 0   
 Less Important 4 2 7   
 As Important 7 0 37   
 More Important 4 0 37   
 Do Not Know 0 0 5   
   15 2 86 103 
 Logistical Support 
 Unimportant 2 2 0   
 Less Important 7 0 14   
 As Important 6 0 41   
 More Important 0 0 29   
 Do Not Know 0 0 2   
   15 2 86 103 
 Monetary Support 
 Unimportant 2 2 0   
 Less Important 5 0 10   
 As Important 4 0 40   
 More Important 4 0 31   
 Do Not Know 0 0 4   
   15 2 85 102 
 Intelligence Support 
 Unimportant 3 1 1   
 Less Important 6 1 14   
 As Important 5 0 38   
 More Important 1 0 30   
 Do Not Know 0 0 3   
   15 2 86 103 
 Weapons Provision 
 Unimportant 3 1 4   
 Less Important 7 0 30   
 As Important 5 1 34   
 More Important 0 0 12   
 Do Not Know 0 0 6   
   15 2 86 103 
 answered question 103 
 skipped question 1 
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15. Rank order the five doctrinal core Civil 
Affairs tasks in order of their importance to 
UW operations. 
  
What is your 
MOS?   




Civil Information Management 
First 4 1 39     
Second 6 0 21     
Third 0 0 7     
Fourth 0 0 7     




2.21 2.27 102 
Populace and Resource Control 
First 6 0 13     
Second 2 1 16     
Third 3 0 20     
Fourth 3 1 20     




3.14 3.01 102 
Support to Civil Administration 
First 2 0 20     
Second 3 1 24     
Third 6 1 23     
Fourth 2 0 11     




2.57 2.57 101 
Foreign Humanitarian Assistance 
First 1 1 5     
Second 2 0 16     
Third 4 0 18     
Fourth 6 1 24     




3.51 3.46 102 
Nation Assistance 
First 1 0 10     
Second 1 0 9     
Third 1 1 18     
Fourth 3 0 24     




3.52 3.62 102 
answered question 102 
skipped question 2 





      16. Select the top 3 of the following 
elements of Civic Action based on their 
importance to the success of a UW 
Campaign. 
  
What is your 
MOS?   
Answer Options 18 37 38 Response Percent 
Respons
e Count 
Civil Information Management 4 0 27 30.1% 31 
Populace and Resource Control 4 0 11 14.6% 15 
Support to Civil Administration 2 2 16 19.4% 20 
Foreign Humanitarian Assistance 2 2 6 9.7% 10 
Nation Assistance 2 0 8 9.7% 10 
Civil Reconnaissance 7 0 34 39.8% 41 
Key Leader Engagement 2 0 35 35.9% 37 
Shadow Government Development 9 0 38 45.6% 47 
Mass Mobilization of Populace 3 0 12 14.6% 15 
Support to Guerrilla Warfare 1 0 11 11.7% 12 
Cover for Action 3 0 13 15.5% 16 
Access and Placement 2 2 42 44.7% 46 
Advising/Mentoring 2 0 11 12.6% 13 
Basic Soldier Skills 1 0 1 1.9% 2 
answered question 103 
skipped question 1 
       
       17. In which campaign phases is Civic 
Action useful to support Unconventional 
Warfare? 
  
What is your 
MOS?   





None 0 0 0 0.0% 0 
Phase 0 (Left of Beginning) 1 0 11 11.7% 12 
Phase 1 (Preparation) 3 0 20 22.3% 23 
Phase 2 (Initial Contact) 0 0 19 18.4% 19 
Phase 3 (Infiltration) 0 0 8 7.8% 8 
Phase 4 (Organization) 2 0 17 18.4% 19 
Phase 5 (Buildup) 1 0 16 16.5% 17 
Phase 6 (Employment) 3 0 14 16.5% 17 
Phase 7 (Transition) 6 2 18 25.2% 26 
All 9 0 53 60.2% 62 
Don’t know 0 0 1 1.0% 1 
answered question 103 
skipped question 1 
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       18. Select the top 3 of the following types 
of personal or professional contacts that 
are most important to the EXECUTION of 
a UW campaign. 
  
What is your 
MOS?   
Answer Options 18 37 38 Response Percent 
Respons
e Count 
Nongovernmental Organizations (NGO) 2 0 17 18.6% 19 
Intergovernmental Organizations (IGO) 3 0 9 11.8% 12 
Indigenous Populations and Institutions 
(IPI) 
10 2 45 55.9% 57 
Contractor 1 0 0 1.0% 1 
Military 3 0 21 23.5% 24 
Political 6 0 24 29.4% 30 
Tribal/Clan Leadership 8 0 62 68.6% 70 
Social Organization Leaders 6 2 44 51.0% 52 
Criminal Elements 0 0 3 2.9% 3 
Students 1 2 3 5.9% 6 
Refugee Populations 1 0 4 4.9% 5 
Dissident Leaders 4 0 27 30.4% 31 
answered question 102 
skipped question 2 
       
       19. Select the top 3 of the following types 
of personal or professional contacts that 
are most important to be established IN 
ADVANCE OF a UW campaign. 
  
What is your 
MOS?   




Nongovernmental Organizations (NGO) 6 1 27 33.0% 34 
Intergovernmental Organizations (IGO) 4 0 16 19.4% 20 
Indigenous Populations and Institutions 
(IPI) 5 1 40 44.7% 46 
Contractor 0 0 0 0.0% 0 
Military 4 0 19 22.3% 23 
Political 6 0 23 28.2% 29 
Tribal/Clan Leadership 5 0 50 53.4% 55 
Social Organization Leaders 3 0 45 46.6% 48 
Criminal Elements 2 0 0 1.9% 2 
Students 2 1 3 5.8% 6 
Refugee Populations 5 2 12 18.4% 19 
Dissident Leaders 3 1 27 30.1% 31 
answered question 103 
skipped question 1 
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       20. Select the top three of the following 
types of training that are important in 
preparing Civil Affairs personnel to 
support an Unconventional Warfare 
campaign. 
  
What is your 
MOS?   





Source Operations 1 0 23 23.5% 24 
Interpersonal Skills 7 2 49 56.9% 58 
Negotiation Skills 6 2 39 46.1% 47 
Elicitation Techniques 2 0 30 31.4% 32 
Social Network Analysis 7 0 38 44.1% 45 
Civil Information Management 9 1 37 46.1% 47 
Civil Assessment 11 1 26 37.3% 38 
Surveillance 1 0 6 6.9% 7 
Counter-Surveillance 1 0 16 16.7% 17 
answered question 102 
skipped question 2 
       
       21. Please provide any comments you 
might have on the selection, training, 
education and employment of Civil Affairs 
or other Special Operations Forces in an 




What is your 
MOS?   
 
Answer Options 18 37 38 Response 
Count 
   6 0 28 34 
 answered question 34 
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